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**THE WORLD BANK GROUP/HISTORIAN'S OFFICE**

**ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM**

**Transcript of interview with**

**ERLE COCKE, JR.**

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**Interview by: William Becker, Jochen Kraske and David Milobsky**

**BECKER:** I'm William Becker with George Washington University and the Business History Group.

**KRASKE:** I'm Jochen Kraske, the Bank's historian.

**MILOBSKY:** I'm David Milobsky, the assistant to the historian.

**COCKE:** And my name is Erle Cocke, C-O-C-K-E, generally called Erle Cocke, Jr.

**BECKER:** It's a pleasure to meet you, Mr. Cocke, and we're glad that you're here for this interview. I wonder if you would mind starting by telling us a little bit about your family background and your educational background.

**COCKE:** Let's start with education. Finished high school at North Fulton High School in Atlanta, Georgia. Finished an A.B. degree at the University of Georgia in the class of 1942 although I really finished in August of '41 on account of the accelerated program of the war at that time. I later got a Master's from Business Administration from Harvard after the war and have got numerous honorary degrees for making speeches at graduation.

**BECKER:** Okay, good. In mentioning the Harvard experience . .

**COCKE:** Okay, Harvard experience? Sure.

**BECKER:** Yeah. Were there people in the class—I believe that McNamara, Robert McNamara was . .

**COCKE:** He was just ahead of us. He really was an assistant type of case writer at that stage. He hadn't quite settled down coming out of the war.

The first class after the war at Harvard was everybody that was half way through, had been accepted but went on active duty rather than going to school type of thing, and that filled up the first group. The second class, which I was in, was all combat people. Everybody was picked for what they had done during the war not for where they had been educated or hadn't been educated and so forth. And it was a rather unique situation. No one ever said anything for the simple reason that if this guy hauled off and said, well, he'd shot down sixteen Japanese, this guy would come in and say, "Well, I got twenty-one Germans over here, planes" and this guy would say, "I got four PT boats here and I shot a carrier there." So everybody had a story, and I think we had a rather unique situation. Every, well, Saturday morning somebody got another decoration, so all the classmates would turn out to see the rest of them get their decorations.

**BECKER:** So McNamara--did you have any contact with McNamara?

**COCKE:** I had only a minor contact with McNamara at the school, but after he came to the [World] Bank, he then—he made a point of always saying we were at Harvard together. Well,

he actually went to Ford about the time I was leaving Harvard. I didn't take a course under him, is what I am trying to say. But we did see what he had written; we did understand what he was trying to accomplish with his own little group. And, look, the whole university was resetting itself coming out of the war.

**BECKER:** We're going to raise the question of McNamara later again with you.

**COCKE:** Now, to answer the family background, we come out of four generations of banking, going all the way back to great-grandfather, grandfather, father and myself, so . .

**BECKER:** In Atlanta?

**COCKE:** Well, it all originally started in our home town of Dawson, Georgia. The Bank of Dawson today is still in existence, a 1910 bank that my grandfather actually founded and was the first president of.

My father was president for 20 years of the Fulton National Bank in Atlanta, which is now the Bank of the South, and he was a past president of the American Bankers Association. He was also chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. He was the Democrat in the [Dwight D.] Eisenhower Administration and became chairman, when [John F.] Kennedy became President, of the FDIC. He was at Bretton Woods himself. Here is the only clipping I could find, which was in the ATO [Alpha Tau Omega fraternity] magazine, which says "Brother Cocke at Bretton Woods" and this is a story about his participation. He really was the only commercial banker in the truest sense that spent the whole time at Bretton Woods. He was there for the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, who was Senator Walter F. George from Georgia, and he's the one that put the commercial banking side into the original thinking at the thing. His first objection was that they named the Bank and [International Monetary] Fund backwards. He always wanted the Fund to be called the Bank and he wanted the Bank to be called the Fund, but other people prevailed and he couldn't sell that.

**BECKER:** Let me ask you a little bit—in talking about background and all—a little bit about your military background. Obviously it was important to you and your career.

**COCKE:** Well, I have to say that there were only eight people that I have found that were ever executed, and I am one of the people that were executed by a German firing squad and lived to tell the tale. No cat's got but nine lives, and I have sort of used up about eight of mine. Incidentally, the 25<sup>th</sup> day of April—this the 27<sup>th</sup>--was the 49<sup>th</sup> anniversary of day alive with me. One thing--I have a blank of about 28 days after I was left for dead before I became conscious. They left me for dead, and I went two and a half years in the hospital and made up my mind in all of that rehabilitation and everything else that I was going to be remembered for living not for dying.

**BECKER:** Okay, good. Now when you came back from the war, what did you do right after the war? I mean, you went to Harvard, and then after Harvard?

**COCKE:** I kept on going to school and kept on trying to get myself able to go.

Then my first job was executive director of the Agricultural and Industrial Development Board in Georgia, which was the State Department of Commerce. This was in the very hard times in Georgia because we had two governors and a very famous fight over who was governor at that time. And most of my political life started as soon as I was old enough to read the newspaper.

**KRASKE:** But you didn't try to become a banker then? It would have been natural for you to follow the . .

**COCKE:** I really moved into transportation first, but I found that what transportation was, whether I was running a railroad or running an airline, it still came back to the fact that the people that are running big institutions have got to be financially qualified and therefore you don't need a pilot to be the president of an airline. You need somebody that can say "Yes" and "No" from an executive point of view and can sit on the other side of the table and tell you whether they are going to lend you some money or not lend you some money.

So when I was being [questioned at my confirmation hearing]--they asked me did I know anything about loans, and I said, "Yes, I've borrowed an awful lot of money. I know a good bit about what side it takes and what kind of qualifications it takes to make the decision whether you are going to loan money or not." That brought a good chuckle on Capitol Hill when I told them that I had borrowed an awful lot of money, I didn't know whether I could lend an awful lot of money or not.

**BECKER:** Now you mentioned Bretton Woods. You weren't there but you followed what went on there?

**COCKE:** I was at the first meeting at Savannah. Now don't stretch that out of proportion: I was a chauffeur. I mean, there's no point in acting like I wasn't. But I was driving Secretary John Snyder, who was the Secretary of the Treasury at the time, who was chairman of the meeting. I was smart enough to absorb everything that went on in that automobile, and therefore my corporate memory of the first meeting is probably as good as anybody you've got that's alive today. Now to say that I was a voting delegate and I made all kinds of speeches, the answer is no, I was a chauffeur. But I was young enough to absorb it all; I was interested in what was going on; I had a good relationship that started there with John McCloy.

Obviously I was even there before Black was there, I mean Eugene Black was there, because he really didn't come in 'til '47. I had a lot of dealings with William McChesney Martin, who later was Federal Reserve [Bank Chairman], when he was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and so forth. So we made a lot of contacts there that stayed with me.

Actually, Secretary Snyder and I maintained a relationship from then 'til he died. I mean, one thing is he and my father were very contemporary and they had both run FDIC agencies, one in St. Louis and one in Atlanta, back in '34, '35, '36, structure and so forth.

In those days, by the way, the FDIC was over here on the corner of 19<sup>th</sup> and H, which had just been moved out when the Department of Commerce built that building. And when the

Department of Commerce moved out the FDIC moved in, and they stayed there 'til the World Bank moved in.

**BECKER:** Who else other than Snyder did you have contact with at these meetings, and are there any personal impressions that you have of some of these people?

**COCKE:** Well, I think the best impression of Savannah was simply that all of the people who had the responsibility of their governments just didn't want to say anything or do anything until Secretary Snyder was in his seat and seated. They would call on you to speak, and all of a sudden if he looked down there and for one reason the Secretary had moved out, he didn't want to talk anymore. And therefore it was very obvious that the presiding officer, ready to hit the gavel to start, Secretary Snyder wasn't there, all of a sudden we didn't start. I mean it was—that kind of an impression I think is well worth recording, that they were so anxious to make it work. They were--this was the first time you really had government officials ready to do something. At Bretton Woods it was still very theoretical as to what's going to happen, and this was when we were finally going to draft what would have been for a better set of--constitution and bylaws had been adopted, but these are the bylaws and the day to day operating procedure that we need to formulate.

**KRASKE:** Did you get any sense—I mean, there were some disagreements, notably between [John Maynard] Keynes, there were disagreements over where the institution should be located and there were disagreements about what the Executive Directors should be doing and whether they should be permanent?

**COCKE:** Oh, right, and let me say this: they were just as varied as they could possibly be. Now you've got to realize that on account of Bretton Woods—this led all of the UN agencies. Most people forget that the Bank and the Fund are older than the UN, and therefore although they were under the UN it still was where a great deal of early decisions were being made and it was a place where the structure of it became important.

I would say that the real answer to why it came to Washington was mainly Eugene Meyer. Now, he was running *The Washington Post*; he didn't care much about being president of the Bank, to be perfectly honest with you, but he wanted this institution, the two institutions, here in Washington. This was a typical Washingtonian, Washingtonian newspaper personality looking after his city. So he wasn't president but a little over six months, but that's the one thing that he pressed and pushed very hard was to make sure that the Bank was located here.

**KRASKE:** Did he participate in the Savannah meetings?

**COCKE:** Yes. Yes, in Savannah he did. He was always—I think the best way to say it is that: “Thank you for your suggestion. I'll add it to my list.” He didn't comment on a lot of things, in my memory, but he was always letting everybody put something else on the agenda. And that's one reason that they didn't really make a lot of decisions is because, one, they didn't have enough votes to make a lot of decisions and, two, they wanted to be darn sure that we just have a full agenda here and we will work that agenda down to yes and no answers as we go along.

**BECKER:** Did your father know Meyer as well as Secretary Snyder?

**COCKE:** Not quite as strongly. Oh, knew him, yes, but we were all tied to the political side of it not so much the structure.

You've got to realize that by this time [Harry S] Truman has been in two years or a year and a half and Truman people are taking over. The Roosevelt people are either old enough to want to quit or don't fit the present pattern and they started shifting themselves out, so that McCloy was a Truman person, where Meyer was a Roosevelt person is the best way for you to clarify that because, see, [Henry Jr.] Morgenthau was at Bretton Woods, but Snyder was in Savannah, so that you had a different political acumen coming forward. And Snyder came from the RFC [U.S. Reconstruction Finance Corporation], and therefore he came as a development banker in his thinking as opposed to a commercial banker.

**BECKER:** Okay. Now, after this, after these meetings, we can see on your resume you moved to the Central Georgia Railroad . .

**COCKE:** Railroad, yes.

**BECKER:** . . but you were also very active in the American Legion, and you were surprisingly the national commander at what I'd consider a fairly young age.

**COCKE:** Yes, I was the youngest national commander we've ever had when I was 29 years old. The second youngest commander was Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., in 1919 and he was 30 years old. And to have been the national commander, three and a half million members, at that early age was an imprint on my life, no question about it. I'm asked many times, "How did you become the youngest national commander of the American Legion?" Very simple: "Get the most votes."

My father had been very active in the American Legion. He was a national vice-commander elected in 1922 and presided at the convention in 1923. So we had a few favors left over from that. But I was exactly what the Legion leadership wanted. I had been on Capitol Hill about a half a dozen times as an expert witness type of person. I had the . .

**BECKER:** On military matters?

**COCKE:** Oh, yes. And became a real expert on universal military training and its evaluation of the whole military educational system. And obviously these were very hot issues, selective service as well as U-M-T, universal military training. So that that went fine. I might close by saying I am now the oldest national commander of the American Legion, so if you live long enough you can be the youngest and the oldest.

**BECKER:** Now in the years intervening, in the '50s for the most part, did you while you were at the railroad, did you follow what was happening at the Bank?

**COCKE:** To a certain extent. I followed government very closely: Atomic Energy Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, all of the governmental and inter-state commerce commissions, there was hardly anything I wasn't on top of it.

I was very much involved in politics. I ran Senator [Richard B.] Russell's campaign both in '48 and particularly in '52 when he ran for the Presidency, so I had a good relationship that was there.

Truman liked me because I was a Democrat and I was--the first national commander of the American Legion was George N. Craig from Indiana. He always looked upon him as a Republican; he went on to be governor of Indiana after he was national commander. And Truman's attitude is: "When are you going to run? Go going. Want you in there." And he gave me a pretty good push on those levels. I had a great relationship with Truman on a personal basis and . . .

**BECKER:** Well, we know you ran later in the '60s. Why didn't you run in the '50s?

**COCKE:** In the earlier days it was a question mainly of watching to be sure my health was going to hold up, to be honest with you. I had spent two and a half years in the hospital and I had done the MBA course in sixteen months straight through—we got off one week for Christmas in the whole sixteen months; you can't have any more concentrated than that. So that was part of the deal.

And then as I went along I watched for opportunities. I had a seat in Congress offered me but I wouldn't have been national commander so I had to make that choice in, well, really '50 because both of them--I would either have been elected to Congress in '50 or I would have been elected national commander in '50 and . . .

**BECKER:** Which district in Georgia?

**COCKE:** This would have been the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congressional district in Georgia, which is peanut country, southwest Georgia where we all came from, where I was born, where the original banks were and everything on that score. But I passed that up. I look back at it and say I probably made the wisest decision to have been commander. And then I didn't marry 'til '55 and then we raised a family and . . .

Timing is the most important thing in politics. I . . .

**BECKER:** Georgia was still solidly Democratic at that time.

**COCKE:** Oh, extremely so. Now look, I'd have been in great shape if my friend Dick Russell had been elected president. I would have been a major, major adviser; there's no question about that. In fact, they've even talked when [Jimmy] Carter was picking out his staff, he said, "Well, if Dick Russell had won you'd have had somebody younger than you are." So I can't say much about the youngness of the [William J.] Clinton Administration; I was that young, too.

**BECKER:** Otherwise did you know Carter?

**COCKE:** Oh, extremely. He and I go way back from the beginning. See, his name is James Earl Carter. He spells Earl E-A-R-L and I of course spell mine E-R-L-E. The difference is that E-A-R-L is the English title; E-R-L-E is the Saxon title.

And therefore I must have been—the best I can calculate, I was about five or maybe six. His father was called Earl Carter, and he was a warehouseman, cotton warehouseman, peanuts later on, and he sat by the chinaberry tree and whittled and everybody in the community came around to listen to him.

And I walked up there, and he said, “Who you, boy?” Kind of an attitude.

I told him my name.

He says, “You go to school?”

“Yes, I go to school.”

“You know how to tie your shoes?”

“Oh, I’m very proud of the fact I can tie my shoes.”

And he says, “I bet you you don’t know how to spell your name.”

So I wrote in the sand, more drawing it than writing it in the sand and so on.

He said, “You don’t know how to spell Earl. You spell Earl E-A-R-L.”

And I said, “No, I spell Erle E-R-L-E. That’s right.” See.

Well, now that’s one of my earlier recollections. That was with his father, who was mayor of Plains, state senator from Plains and everything like that. He was there, he was contemporary, was a World War I veteran.

And so as Jimmy Carter came along, I really knew Don Carter, first cousin, and Hugh Carter, first cousin, because they were my age where Carter was five years behind us. Well, that makes us sometimes a great deal of difference. When you’re coming through you know those that were in your classes rather than those younger brothers that were coming to high school when you’d finished, I mean that type of thing.

But I knew his peanut background, and of course I had a peanut background. My thesis at Harvard was on peanuts, as you might expect. Still it’s used as a pretty good document, because where it would take you six months to read everything written about cotton, you can read everything written about peanuts in about six weeks. And there’s almost nothing new for



peanuts. Like peanut butter, it all came out of the coffee roasting business, it came out of the stoning business, it--all machinery for peanut butter was adapted from some other product. Mayonnaise jars were used to put peanut butter in them, all that kind of thing. I'm the first one that ever identified Spanish peanuts as the fact that 720 is what it takes to make a pound. And I counted them.

**BECKER:** Did you have something to do with all the peanuts that Delta Airlines serves?

**COCKE:** Yes, we highly recommended that in the very early days. We had been pretty much Coca-Cola oriented at Delta because of the finances thing, and we were also R.J. Reynolds thing. R.J. Reynolds, Jr., was the biggest Delta stockholder, and therefore they gave away cigarettes, gave away four on every flight. And then at the time we said, "Well, why don't we give away peanuts instead of giving away chewing gum?" Because chewing gum was—where do you put it? How do you get rid of it? It's good to have when you're coming up and down but when do you get rid of it? You can chew the peanuts; it gives you the same thing. This was before aircraft were pressurized. And therefore I did help put peanuts on and stayed. And I did my best to keep alcohol off of the aircraft as long as we could and then finally competition forced us. That's the question.

**BECKER:** After the '50s, could you describe the circumstances surrounding your coming to the World Bank?

**COCKE:** Well, I think we have to start by saying that I had been at the UN in '59 and '60. There again I was a Democrat in the Eisenhower Administration. I was the first organized veteran person that had ever gone. I was the youngest person in the U.S. delegation that had ever come up 'til that time, and then after I went there at 38, everybody and his little brother that was 35 or 36 all wanted to go to the U.N. So that that's the way that went.

When we got to November of '60 and Kennedy had been elected, it came with the—probably the biggest problem was that the Secretary of the Treasury had been promised to New Jersey, and it was to be Eugene Black. Eugene Black had his first prostate operation, and not only did it turn out terribly, but it turned out cancerous and even the second one still didn't get a clean bill of health, and it just scared him to death that he couldn't do what he wanted to do. He expected to be Secretary of the Treasury. He'd gotten to know Kennedy pretty well in about '58 or '59; there were a couple of trips to India and Pakistan. This was before the Indus River really got started, before the real consortiums got started.

But Eugene Black was a good politician. And he was from Georgia, too, of course. His grandfather was the great Henry W. Grady of fame and fortune as far as all Southern literature is concerned. And so he knew me and was a contemporary of my father's, and so when the question came up about that: "Don't go to the Treasury; the best place is the Bank. There's going to be some spots at the Bank. It's not organized like I want it"--we just still had just one Alternate in John Hooker; he was the Alternate for the Fund and he was Alternate for the Bank—"and we don't have a full time U.S. Director, and it's not what I want." So make a long story short, he really found me as much as anything, thinking that he was going to the Treasury and he wanted some people left at the Bank that were his people, is the best way to say it.

Make a long story short there, he couldn't take it. Then the big question came along that: "All right, still promised to New Jersey, who've you got?"

The New Jersey people came up and said, "The only one we've got is the outgoing Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon. Gave \$50,000 to [Richard M.] Nixon on the record, \$50,000 in his wife's name on the record. He's the best one we've got." Well, make a long story short, at that point nobody was more surprised than Dillon when it was offered to him. And he went through it.

At the same time the other Georgia question came up: who was going to be Secretary of State. And they settled on Dean Rusk. Nobody ever had a tougher time because they made him Secretary of State and then they turned around and told him that he had to take care of the five or six, seven people that he had beat out for the job. He had to give them all a job: Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, George Ball—let's see—Soapy [G. Mennen] Williams, Averell Harriman. You just keep going down the list, and he gave them all a job. They made him the Secretary but he couldn't pick his own team; he had to use everybody else that was left.

So then Black decided to stay here at the Bank, and that went fine. I called him up and said, "What do you want me to do?"

He says, "I want you still come to the Bank." And he says, "Will you to take the Alternate's job?" He says, "You can do more with the Alternate's job than you can do with the Executive's job. And I want you to be here full time." So I was the first full time true Executive and so forth. And he says, "I want you paid by the Bank, but I want you to have a second hat over in the Treasury." So I had a second hat in the Treasury, which was Assistant to the Secretary, which was nothing but in the world but press credentials in case you didn't want to talk from the Bank's point of view, wanted to talk from the Treasurer's point of view.

Then the big question came with Joe Fowler, Henry Fowler. Henry Fowler had been up on Capitol Hill about twenty years. We had called him up early on in about Thanksgiving and told him that he was going to be general counsel in the Treasury and he was just happy as he could be. I called him up about two weeks later and told him, "Joe, you're not going to get the job as general counsel."

"Oh, they promised it. It means it's all set. No problem about it" and so forth.

I said, "No, you're going to be the Under Secretary." This was before we had a Deputy.

And he said, "How did I bounce up four notches?"

I said, "Because we've got the responsibility of the politics of the Treasury."

So my office was at the Bank; my power was at the Treasury.

**BECKER:** Who was the E.D. [Executive Director], the American E.D.?

**COCKE:** Well, that was [John M.] Leddy. He had come over from State. He had been Assistant Secretary of State, and that's the only person that Dillon brought with him. And they made him the thing. But the only time he came was on absolute insistence on me that—we had the major question of Cuba came up. We had already been through Czechoslovakia getting out and Poland getting out, and we had those precedents where they got out of everything. Cuba came in and said, "We want to get out of the Bank, but we don't want to get out of the Fund." So this brought up a new technical question that had never been raised before, and we had to vote on it. So I forced Leddy to come to his one meeting the whole time he was Executive Director, so he could vote there. And he didn't do a thing in the world but come in and vote to let Cuba out of the Bank. And we then turned the technical question back over to the Fund, and the Fund then said they can stay in the Fund, but the Bank had to vote first, see, to make that situation, and that's the one time he came when he was Executive Director.

**BECKER:** Now how did the other members of the Board [of Executive Directors] feel about this relationship?

**COCKE:** Oh, I was, I was greeted greatly. Boy, I started in making this place work; I made this place turn around. The first thing I did was organize the so-called "tea and coffee" at four o'clock in the afternoon, which pleased all of the British and Commonwealth types. But what did I do there? That's when I sampled what was going on.

I ended up running the, for a better title, the Agenda Committee. The Agenda Committee involved, for all practical purposes was nothing in the world but [Morton M.] Mendels and myself, Mendels being the Secretary. And we'd sit down: "You ready to vote on this?"

"Yes. The U.S. Government's ready to go; put it on the agenda." If the U.S. Government's not ready to go, stays off the agenda.

So you talking about power, I had all the power you ever wanted. I was controlling the cockeyed agenda without any trouble at all.

How did everybody else take me? Well, I was seated between Otto Donner from the Germans—I'd always said that I'd been executed by the Germans; we changed that on the biographical sketch and put I was "executed by the Nazis" to please him and it greatly helped that situation. And I had [Gengo] Suzuki on the other side and made him good by recognizing how effective he was. He went from, as he says, from a dungeon to a penthouse in one day because they were about to try him for his--Tokyo trials were about to try him until they found out he knew more about gold in Japan than anybody else and they literally took him from a dungeon to a penthouse in that same day. And from then on he went all the way on up through the whole structure. And if he'd stayed in Japan he would have been prime minister, but he had preferred to work all the UN agencies, both in New York and here. And he was Bank and Fund for years, and then even after he retired here he went and organized the Japanese banks in London and stayed there and was just about as effective in the Japanese banks in London as he would have been if he'd stayed in Tokyo.

But I didn't mean to go off on that side situation, but you—what I'm trying to say is that I was accepted. I had no trouble.

Lord Cromer was then Sir--he wasn't a lord then, he was "Sir"—he was sort of going off as I was coming on, and therefore David Pitblado, who had been a personal secretary to [Winston] Churchill during the war years, had been really basically a speechwriter type of thing (although he didn't like the term "speechwriter;" he liked the term "personal secretary to the prime minister"), he was coming on.

At that time, I voted 28 percent; the British voted 15 percent, so it made a great deal of difference whether I made the motion, whether I second the motion, or sat mute. And I could almost defeat something just by not saying anything. And that was the way we went into it. I had a very effective thing. I had an absolute 100% voting record and attendance record. And this amazed them. No American had hardly been there with any regularity at all, even back to when Black was Executive Director. He just came for the meeting.

All meetings were on Tuesday and the Fund was on Wednesday. We didn't have but one board room, even when I started, on the tenth floor and therefore the biggest thing is scheduling room as to who could meet, see! I mean not when to meet. Then it got to where the Fund was meeting Monday and Wednesday and then the Bank was meeting Tuesday. And then we couldn't do it all on Tuesday so we went to Tuesday and Thursday, and that worked pretty good. And then nobody really wanted to work on Friday, so it really meant that we had two meetings, both, at the time.

I had a good relationship with [Roman L.] Horne, too, who was Secretary in the Fund at the time. And as a result, I found that if I talked to Horne and to [Frank A., Jr.] Southard, who was then the U.S. Executive in the Fund—and Southard and I had a great relationship with Dillon as Secretary of the Treasury. We were both on his Monday . .

**BECKER:** I was going to ask you about the relationship.

**COCKE:** . . Monday eating list. Until--we didn't never know whether we were going on Monday, either one of us or both of us, until about 10:30, and they'd call us at 10:30 and say, "The Secretary needs that seat at the table. Don't come." If we didn't hear from them, we went. I mean it was that kind of a relationship. And all during Black's time I had breakfast on Tuesday morning, because he wanted to know what happened at lunch on Monday, see? So those became the two meals that became very important.

**BECKER:** What issues—just turning back for a second to your role on the Board--aside from Cuba which you've mentioned, what were the big issues in the years that you were there?

**COCKE:** Well, expanding the Board was a major issue. Now here was a problem about having two Board rooms was finally settled. And then the next, soon as that was over then are you going to increase the membership and then how are you going to divide it up.

Of course, very few people really understood the politics of the Bank and Fund, and they couldn't understand the every two year election and so forth, so that you had to educate the group all the time. And that's one job that I did was--even though they had been elected, the South African Alternate, he didn't know how he fitted in, he was the--the Yugoslavian Alternate, he didn't know how he worked in. They couldn't--most of them didn't understand that they could move from one group to another. [Pieter] Liefinck was the great architect of how to put things together, and the Belgian would never vote with the Netherlands. And therefore as long as you would set up a group that would work together, that's the way you put it. And most of it was really worked out more at the Fund level than it was at the Bank level by the time I got here in '61.

Now, and remember most of the "coming along" period had produced a few, for a better word, customs and working relationships and a few things like that, so before you increased the Board you had to figure out how you going to divide the votes. And that became . . .

Of course, the big issue that I probably was as much involved in as anything was the potash plant that we gave Israel. It would be worth a minute to talk about that because it was rather historic. There had never been a project in Israel, and Black finally decided that potash was the safest subject. Israel wanted a steel mill and cement factory, everything but what they ought to ask for, so he finally, "Let's let 'em ask for what we can get 'em" to make the test vote on. So potash was the agreed to, and needed potash all over the world, so we'll find some agreement.

Well, I started days ahead and several "tea and coffee" sessions ahead, and finally formally called on each of the Moslem Arab votes at that time and told them what was going to happen. They were irate. Mad. Got second sets of instructions. They'd come and tell me what their instructions were, which were terrible in how strong they were. And I'd soften them up as much as I could, then tried to show them, mathematically, "You ain't got a chance." You see?

And then they'd say, "Well, what" . .

**KRASKE:** Who were the people then . .

**COCKE:** I was just trying to think of them.

**KRASKE:** [Mohamed] Shoaib?

**COCKE:** Yeah. He was in the earlier days, and [Ahmed] Zaki Saad was the, over in the Fund, was the real one that we had to sell. He was from Egypt. And he was the only real Fund Director that really kept up with the Bank--not taking on [Gengo] Suzuki who was on both or [David] Pitblado who was on both or Rene Larre who was on both--but he was the one Director of the Fund that kept up with the Bank although he didn't have a Bank vote, is the best way to say that. And we, of course we had, by that time we had B.K. Nehru, had been a Director, had been an ambassador, then had come back to the Bank on the staff, so that he was still all moving around in this structure.

But to finish the story, having been up at the UN in '59 and '60, I knew all the UN press and particularly Arab UN press and Moslem press, and so we invited them all down here, plus the Washington press, and had a big setup.

And we went in. Final day came, and I got all three of 'em to agree not to speak at the Board. And so . .

**[End Tape 1, Side A]**  
**[Begin Tape 1, Side B]**

**COCKE:** . . this meeting as you could imagine, and nobody really wanted to say anything. And everybody had been told, "The least said the better off you'll be." So we went practically to a vote without anybody saying much more than, "This is what it is," just reading the heading and time to vote. Nobody wanted to speak for it or against it and so forth. And it passed.

**MILOBSKY:** So was that the main concern, just to try to keep a minimum of resistance or friction . .

**COCKE:** Yeah, right.

**MILOBSKY:** . . rather than so much--because you had the votes to carry the measure, right?

**COCKE:** And I took over from Graves, who thought it was terrible, Harold Graves. He says, "You can't do it."

I said, "I'll do it."

I went to all of the press, particularly the New York press that were here, and said, "Now, the one question you cannot ask is what the vote is, because this is a closed meeting and we will tell you that it passed or we will tell you that it didn't pass, but we will not tell you what the division is."

And they said, "Can we ask that question?"

I said, "If you do, you're breaking your confidence with me because I'm inviting you to a press conference when the meeting is over, and you've got a chance to talk to the three people."

Had that all agreed ahead of time; Graves didn't think it could happen. Perfect, just like I'd scheduled it.

The three of them sat there, we finished the vote, and then I brought the three of them out. And they made the most gut-cutting speeches you can ever imagine! They got headlines all over the Moslem world, all over the Arab world. They went from there on to bigger and better jobs in every country that they came from. They were great national and international heroes for their opposition to--all finished by the time they made their speech. And they got the headlines out of it at home. And the press stayed with me. Nobody asked what the vote was, see. And so they

actually did not vote for it because we took the line that they abstained, see. But we did register that it was unanimous of those that did vote, see. So we got by that one, and from then on we never had another problem with it. But the secret of it was being sure we talked to everybody ahead of time, and we didn't miss it.

I think the other one that's worth telling you is when Black was beginning to want to quit. And that was really my job here, was to get Black out when he wanted to get out and to put Black's successor in when the time came.

And I know the Chinese, Doctor R. C. Chen, was next door to me and he'd come in and out offices, open the door and hear my phone, "I'm gone; you pick up my phone," secretaries were close and so forth. But this day he made a very formal appointment, called about 9:15 and said he wanted to call on me at 11 o'clock. Boy, he came in with his hat and his gloves; this was a formal occasion. And I received him.

He started out by saying, "This is not a personal call. This is an official call. I am asked by my government to find out who the next President of the World Bank is going to be."

I said, "At this stage of the game I do not know who the next President of the World Bank is going to be."

**BECKER:** And what year is this?

**COCKE:** This is '62, along about—this is about August of '62. It was about a good month before the Annual Meeting is about the best way to place it.

And I said, "I don't know who the next President is going to be."

And he says, "I need to send a cable home saying that it is my prediction that it'll be so-and-so. And then I want to send a second cable home that says my first prediction in my first cable is correct, therefore I--and in a third one I would like to send a cable home that says that my first prediction and my follow-through is correct and Mr. so-and-so is going to be the President."

I said, "Yes."

And he says, "The one thing that I cannot do is send that fourth one, and that is 'I read in the *New York Times* that it is so-and-so and so-and-so.' I've got to have a scoop."

And I said, "Yes, I understand your feeling about that."

Well, I worked it out for him. I actually wrote the three cables for him when the time came, which was two months later, and of course I had a vote for life from then on, on that score.

I did a lot of little things for them, and they never got it. I made a great point of always introducing Luis Machado as the Dean of the Executive Directors. There weren't a "Dean" anywhere, except in my mind, but ever since there's always been a Dean of the Executive

Directors, meaning whoever is the oldest one there. And even made a point of being sure that no Vice President ever presided because I made the technical question that Black is President of the Bank, yes, but he is Chairman of the Board. There is no Vice Chairman of the Board; there's a Vice President that reports to the President. But then so I made the point that when Black was not there, then the presiding officer was to be a member of the Board and an Executive Director, and therefore I had to create Machado as the Dean to be sure that he presided. That also kept two or three others out of the picture because--Liefstinck would have loved to have had the title, but he didn't. And so that those kinds of things were the thing.

You asked how I maneuvered; I maneuvered every bit of it, yes.

**KRASKE:** But still, I mean when Black was away, it was what--[William A.B.] Iliff or . .

**COCKE:** Well, Iliff was here, and of course [J. Burke] Knapp was here, too, but we wanted to make the point that they didn't preside, that the Board presided, see; the Chairman of the Board was a different status than the President of the Bank.

**KRASKE:** But still, I mean they would be in that chair.

**COCKE:** Oh, yes, they'd be in the room, yeah, but they would not be presiding officer in the room, and plus the fact that when the question of salaries came up and a few things like that it was much better to have that point.

**KRASKE:** What was the sort of sense of the relationship of the Board with some of these other people, I mean with Knapp in particular who was there and Iliff and [Siem] Alderwereld and so on?

**COCKE:** Of course, Knapp was very, very professional; no question about it. Iliff had been here around everywhere, Bill Iliff. Everybody called him "Bill" until he got to be "Sir William" and, boy, from then on nobody called him "Bill."

**KRASKE:** But were they sort of popular or . .

**COCKE:** Well, yes. You've got to realize that both the Bank and Fund by the time I got here, it was well organized. They had bowling organized to the nth degree. One of the first conversations I ever had with Horne was about Bretton Woods Golf Course. We put it off about two or three years because I didn't think the Bank needed to get in it, and I figured that if they'd give them enough time, the Fund would do it. It's exactly what happened. Saved some money that way.

And I always negotiated all of the property. Let the Fund build it and then let the Bank buy it. It worked beautifully.

And the other one, from George Washington's [University] point of view, I had a great relationship with [Lloyd H.] Elliott, who was president over there, and we agreed then: "You



don't go across 19th Street if we don't go across 19th Street." As long as he lived, as long as he was running it, we had a good, gentleman's agreement, and it worked fine.

I later bought the Monarch Apartment House, and the two doctors that we had back there were hard to move on the back side of G Street and so forth.

They had already gotten the corner, though. You probably don't know why the building has got that angle on it and the flags out front.

**BECKER:** There was a house there, wasn't there?

**COCKE:** Oldest house in Washington was there, and it was also the office of the oldest residents in Washington, and they just built the building around it, and finally, when it literally fell down, they finally turned it loose and there wasn't anything to do then but put that showcase out there and put all the flags in it. And it stayed.

**BECKER:** Could I turn back for a minute or two to your relationships with the U.S. Treasury?

**COCKE:** Right.

**BECKER:** As issues came up in the Board, were these the kinds of things that you would raise on a regular basis with people at Treasury? Who did you deal with on a regular basis?

**COCKE:** Are you familiar with the National Advisory Council, N-A-C? It met every Tuesday, and when I say "every Tuesday," 48 or 49 times a year; unless Christmas or New Year's was on Tuesday, it met. You couldn't pick a time when it didn't meet on Tuesday. It was one of those kind of things to where they were all at the level of Secretaries, but none of the Secretaries came unless one Secretary wanted to make a point. If the Secretary of Commerce said, "I'm going to be at the meeting," then all the other counterparts showed up. So it was--deputies ran it practically all the time until there was a difference between Chairman of the Federal Reserve and Secretary of Commerce, and then the Secretary of the Treasury would come in and settle the argument between the two of them, that type of thing. Southard always wanted to appear first, and then he'd leave. I took the other position: I want to sit here and find out what else is happening in the government. And as a result, I knew pretty well how to deal with all of the other Departments in the government. This became the point of information to me. It became the place where I could find out what was happening in any part of the whole Treasury structure.

Then I traveled with Dillon a great deal. Best one to describe is trip to London, the second. He of course had the Chancellor of the Exchequer; I got the shadow cabinet. Shadow Cabinet, opposition, ride in the second car. We were always four and five down the table when you laid out the protocol. I spent a whole week with Jim [L. James] Callaghan. Got to know him extremely well. Six months later he's Prime Minister. Everybody wanted to know how in the world I was so close to the British Prime Minister.

The British Prime Minister calls up and says, "I'm thinking about the Ambassador to Washington. Can I afford to send my son-in-law, Peter Jay?"

I said, "I think he'd make an ideal one. Send him on over here. Can't think of a better person."

And that's the way I "infiltrated" (might be a good word) into everything that came along. I kept up with everything that went along.

And then from the politics, obviously Joe Fowler and I did it. He was the Under Secretary, so he'd come over to the Bank about—when he really wanted to talk to me, he'd call up and say, "Ain't it time for you to feed me?"

And I'd say, "Yes, come on over," because we'd see each other on Mondays, but most of the time he didn't get a chance to talk to me then. And then we would have a chance and we would meet somewhere else at some other time. And he came up to see the Bank. A couple of times I took him in to see both Black and [George D.] Woods and made a formal call out of it.

And then I got Black to start inviting people to come here, which was good, such as McChesney Martin, such as Senator [William J.] Fulbright. They'd all heard of Senator Fulbright and not a one of them had ever seen him. So with my Executive Directors I started giving them a luncheon speaker type of thing. They had none of them lived here for years and they had never seen anything, so I took them sightseeing. I took them down to Mount Vernon with all their families and so forth and took them in there, took them to [U.S. Bureau of] Printing and Engraving, took them to Knoxville and Huntsville and on down to Florence, Alabama, all the whole TVA [U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority] type of operation. And this was kind of service that they'd never not. Of course, I got a vote every time I went. Don't get the idea that I didn't have all the favors due me. I had every favor due me.

And I looked after them. I got them driver's licenses; I got them—set up all kind of visitations; got all the wives organized in terms of inviting the new people in here and so forth. You just can't conceive of what I did. I mean, I ran the place.

**BECKER:** Did any of your predecessors try to—it strikes me that this is the . . .

**COCKE:** They were never here! I'm the first. This is the first time they'd ever seen a U.S. Director, see. They didn't know the U.S. Director, none of the thing. This is what amazed them was that: "You mean to tell me you're going to be here full time and we can talk to you any time we want to?"

And I said, "Yes, I'm here full time. You can talk to me any time you want to."

**BECKER:** Now, when you met with Fowler—what I'm trying to get at here is the nature of the relationship between the—I mean, obviously the relationship between the Treasury and the E.D. was important. But did you bring issues to him, or did he bring issues to you? Did you get directives from him as to what to think about things?

**COCKE:** We sort of met the issues both ways. “What kind of strength do you think you’ve now at the Bank? What can you get them to do?” Back and forth. And certainly we didn’t have the kind of relationship that John Connally had later on when he was Secretary of the Treasury when they just stopped talking to each other. Boy, we had all kind of communication going on, and went fine.

I think what came to a real impact, too, was when Kennedy was finally killed and buried. Then, although I had had a wonderful relationship with Dillon to that point, at that stage of the game Dillon was just, paramount in his mind: “I was committed to Kennedy, but I don’t know whether I’m committed to [Lyndon B.] Johnson or not. I don’t know whether Johnson wants me or not” and so forth. So I became probably more valuable to Dillon because, although—see, I was on Johnson’s patronage, see, and so . .

**BECKER:** I mean, how so?

**COCKE:** Well, when you divide up patronage in the U.S., somebody is your sponsor and so that I . .

**BECKER:** So your initial appointment was really through Johnson as Vice President?

**COCKE:** Well, yeah, right, and so that it was only natural that he would turn to me. He called up, said, “What do I do?”

I said, “Absolutely nothing except go to the funeral and wait for the first Cabinet meeting. There’re not going to be any abrupt changes.”

**BECKER:** This is Dillon calling.

**COCKE:** Yeah.

Now, Dillon gave me a way a beautiful way to deal with him—this might fit to what you’re asking. When we finally got down and it was obviously finished and so forth, he says, “I want you to go there and work 51 weeks of the year.”

**BECKER:** Now this is Dillon speaking to you?

**COCKE:** This is Dillon speaking to me.

**BECKER:** About working here?

**COCKE:** About here. He says, “I want you to work at the Bank 51 weeks of the year. The 52nd week I will be at the Bank, and that will be the Annual Meeting.” He says, “I’ll give one dinner, I’ll give one cocktail party, and I’ll give one speech that I’d like for you to write, or at least the first draft of it.”

I said, “All right, sir. Fine.”

And then he says, "In the upper right-hand corner I want your initials because I'm not going to read any papers that come from the Bank unless your initials are up in the right-hand corner. If you have read it, and you think it's important enough for me to read, you mark what I should read, and I promise you I'll read it. If you don't think it ought to be sent to me, don't send it to me. If you think I should have a knowledge of it and filed over here, yes, but what you really want me to read you mark it."

And then he, classically, comes around and says to me, "I will give you the priority between eight o'clock in the morning and nine o'clock in the morning on the telephone. I can't take your call when you call, but I'll call you back in that hour. And don't bother me any of the rest of the time."

I said, "Yes, sir. Fine."

Gave Southard the same position. So Southard and I would call. I found that calling about 8:10 or 8:15 was the best time to start it, and about 8:25 to 8:35 is when he'd call me back, and he was ready to respond right then. "You got a problem today? What do you need to know? What can I help you on?" Scheduling, whatever it might be. He was real quick and very nice.

The classic one was Upper Volta at that time came along. Bauxite, the question. It had gone through fairly slowly, had been approved the preceding Tuesday at the National Security Council. And I called up, and I said, "Mr. Secretary, I notice President Kennedy has got a press conference today, and I wouldn't be at all surprised if he didn't get a question that asked something like, 'Mr. President, do you know your Executive Director at the World Bank today voted for X number of dollars for Upper Volta? Do you even know where Upper Volta is, Mr. President? Have you ever heard of Ouagadougou?' And Ouagadougou is the capital and so forth, couple of other tidbits."

And he says, "Have we approved it through the routine?"

I said, "Yes, sir, it's approved."

He says, "Are you going to vote for it?"

And I said, "Yes, sir, unless you tell me otherwise. I'm set to do, carry it out. But I just thought we ought to protect the President."

He says, "I think you are right." He says, "Stand by and stay on hold."

He put me on hold. Five, six, seven minutes went by. He got the President, talking to Kennedy, and the next thing both of them come on my line, had both of them on the line, and he says, President says, "Erle, I understand you think I've got a problem."

I said, "Yes, sir, Mr. President. I think you are going to be asking about it, and I just want you to be sure you're briefed and posted."

He says, "Is it correct?"

I said, "Yes, sir, it's correct."

He says, "Is this one of these things that somebody worried about for six months?"

I said, "I'd say closer to nine or ten months in the study and the routine."

And he says, "And you got the authority to do it?"

I said, "Yes, sir. "

He says, "Vote for it." And he says, "I hope they ask me at the press conference about it."

Sure enough, it was the second question--it was over at the State Department in those days where they had the press conferences--the second question out, and the President just hit him right straight through, you know. "Why, certainly, I even talked to Erle Cocke about that this morning, and I approved it not only personally but I know the details about it, and I do understand what's the problem here, and I'm delighted that we have been able to make such a forward step, and I'm glad you're keeping up with the World Bank and the Fund. They are great news stories. You ought to have more attention to them." And all of a sudden, instead of them thinking they'd tripped the President, they had him just sitting up just like he'd just eat them up, see. And that kind of a relationship was great, of course, and . . .

**KRASKE:** Well, generally, I suppose, the relationship between the U.S. and the Bank at that time was quite positive . . .

**COCKE:** Couldn't have been any better. Now, George Ball, he just sort of—he was then the Under Secretary (weren't any Deputies over in State then), but he was the second man, and although he showed up as, you know, an Alternate Governor at the Annual Meetings and so forth from State's point of view, he practically pulled out of it. He didn't get into it. We kept in touch with State on a working level but not at the high level.

And I'd see Ball, and he'd say, "Well, it looks like you and Dillon are settling everything. There's no point in me interfering."

"Fine."

And then I did get him, Ball, to call Leddy and be sure that Leddy got there on the Cuban question. That's the one time that I asked George Ball and said, "Now, look, I need you to make a telephone call."

"Who you want me to call?"

I said, "It's just right here in town."

And he said, “Oh, you mean I don’t have to stay up all night to talk to somebody.” He thought I was making him, you know, call all over the world.

I said, “No, all I want you to do is call Leddy.”

And he did.

**BECKER:** Could I just follow up on something you’ve mentioned a few minutes ago, and that is the transition for Black. Could you talk a little more about how . . .

**COCKE:** How that went?

**BECKER:** . . . that worked? You were talking about the relations with the, you know, you were talking with the Chinese E.D.

**COCKE:** Actually it was done fairly quietly, might be the best word. They had already followed the fact that--start with the Chase Bank. Chase Bank is more interested in having their man as Secretary of State than the Presidency because there's more banking involved. Black had come out of the Chase. McCloy had come out of the Chase. And Dillon Reed had all banked at the Chase. You see what I’m saying? So that the Chase was the dominating bank as far as where do you find all of these experts, where do you find all of the staff, where do you move people in and out. And then the Federal Reserve. So the question of do you pull them out? They didn't want many out of the Treasury, and not too many came to the Bank and Fund from the Treasury. Most of them came from State and came from Federal Reserve and from the Chase Bank.

So when you get down to that, the question got down to George Woods. They had put him on a couple of traveling groups back in the late ‘50s and sent him to the Philippines on a project.

And then Black got into it, and he wanted to turn it over.

At that stage of the game Woods finally was sort of picked . . .

**KRASKE:** Who was the one who was pushing Woods?

**COCKE:** Now, remember that Black had—that Woods had already missed on Capitol Hill. He really wanted the AID [U.S. Agency for international Development] job, and [Henry R.] Labouisse got the AID job because Labouisse could be confirmed. He still had a few scars left over from the circus—this is a Barnum and Bailey, Ringling Brothers circus. Ringling Brothers family had all been tied into First Boston, First Boston being the fundraiser for the whole circus industry. So that all got in to play, and when the final time came it was very obvious that that was going to be the one.

Now I think the best place to say, in all candor, that I didn't expect to be President, but I was sitting on top of it. I knew more about it than anybody else. Machado and Donner and Lieftinck

and Chen and Suzuki, they all wanted me to be President. Well, I said, "Look, I don't have a chance to being President. I don't have any points to trade with." Black will go on the Shakespearean board and he'll go back on the Chase board and he'll go on the Metropolitan board. Woods will come off the Metropolitan Life; Woods will come off the Chase board. He won't come off of Shakespeare, but he'll come off the circus boards, so the difference between Shakespeare and the circus sort of became the difference between the two of them. And therefore it was a swap situation of "you take over these directorships, and I'll take over those." I honestly think that had Kennedy not been killed, I might have had a chance, to be honest with you, not so much to be President of the Bank following Black, because the one thing, although Black had been my sponsor, Black had been my tutor, Black had been my confidant in the whole operation, here I was the same age as his son, and therefore the idea of being succeeded by somebody of contemporary of Eugene Black, Jr., that bothered him. You see what I'm saying: on a personally. It never bothered our relationship, but it was there and I understood it perfectly and . . .

But as soon as Johnson was in--Woods didn't want to stay a long time, so I literally put Woods in, I mean in the sense of "This is what you all want. I'll get the consensus built, and it will be done like everybody's telling me they want it done: State, Treasury, individuals and so forth." That was all in November of '62.

Woods started getting himself out almost as soon as he got here, if you want to know the truth. He wanted to reorganize so that he could quit any time he wanted to quit, as opposed to saying, "I want to stay here." Black had been here 13 years then, and the one thing he did not want was a long session. Bob [Robert L.] Garner wanted to be President and had gone over to the IFC [International Finance Corporation] and knew he was older than Black, so you're not going to pick a successor to Black who's older than Black and so forth, in terms of that, although he was in good health and did work on another two or three more years around here. But they . . .

I also—you're talking about issues; back to that--I'm the one that made the President of the Bank the President of all of them. They had made Bob Garner President of IFC, and then when he went out, I made a point of putting Black in as also President of that, because I wanted to be sure we had a strong chief executive, is what I sold at every statement. And I still think it was the right decision. And everybody at Treasury backed me up when I asked for permission to do these things.

And make a long story short: by the time I got to finding out whether there was any chance, I went to talk to Johnson. Johnson said, "Nope. I don't need you there. I need you to run for Congress."

**BECKER:** That was my next question . . .

**COCKE:** And he says, "Can't you run for Congress here in '64?"

I said, "Mr. President, if that's what you want, I'm here to help you. I'll do what you want. But this is the time to step out." And I did. I lost by 54 votes, so broke my heart. 80,000 votes cast and 84 votes difference.

**KRASKE:** Did you ask for a recount?

**COCKE:** Oh, look, I've had that question asked thousands of times, and my answer to that is: "We had an unofficial count. We had an official count. We had a unofficial recount. We had an official recount."

And they said, "Well, why didn't you do it?"

I said, "Two things. One, it would have cost me \$10,000 to put up the money for a fifth time to count 'em." And I said, "Look, I had the best friends in the world handling my business on the other four times that they had counted those votes. And if they couldn't count me in in the first four times, they sure weren't going to count me on the fifth time." So I didn't have the fifth recount.

**BECKER:** So then you ran again in . .

**COCKE:** '66. '66 and '64. Of course, the [Barry M.] Goldwater question was the reason I really got beat, to be honest with you, because very early on I made the simple statement that I was a Democrat in a Democratic primary and that I was going to support the Democratic ticket from the courthouse to the White House. Pretty logical, classic statement.

**BECKER:** Statement in the South, certainly.

**COCKE:** See, to make that statement, well, by that time here comes the Goldwater landslide. I was attacked for being at the UN; I was attacked for being at the World Bank; I was attacked for having made a trip to Yugoslavia; I was attacked for having made a trip to Poland; attacked because I had been to Moscow. And the fellow that ran against me, his attitude is, "I'm not tainted. This fellow's eaten with Lyndon Johnson at the White House. He's eaten with Lyndon Johnson. Think of that! See, the terrible situation! And he is—I'm not tainted because I've never been to Washington except on a high school sightseeing tour! And I'm not tainted. And this fellow has been in all of these international agencies and he's done all of these things, and therefore he cannot represent us."

**KRASKE:** Well, what about all these eight million veterans? Where were they?

**COCKE:** Well, they showed up, but they didn't show up at the right place at the right time.

**BECKER:** They all aren't from south Georgia.

**COCKE:** Right. But that's a sidebar on me. Don't over play it.

I think that it was one of those kind of things to where I was very conscious of it when Woods got to the point where he really wanted to get out, he sent for me. Of course I'd been out of it by then.



**KRASKE:** You kept in touch with him?

**COCKE:** I kept in touch with him, and I'm the one that worked out the extra sixth year. They couldn't agree on anybody, and I went to him and I said, "Look, the simple solution, if you want to know how to do this from George Woods' point of view, is for you to make up your mind that you will stay one more year."

**KRASKE:** That was after they had focused on McNamara already?

**COCKE:** Well, they hadn't quite focused on McNamara per se, but Johnson called me in; he says, "I hope you are going down to Rio." '67 meeting.

And I said, "Yes, sir, Mr. President. I'll be there."

And he says, "Call me up and tell me whether McNamara's got enough votes to win."

I called him after I'd been down there about three, four days, I called him up. I said, "Mr. President, he ain't got about five or six votes."

He says, "You ain't going to make it unanimous?"

I said, "No. There ain't a chance of making it unanimous."

And he says, "Well, what can you do?"

I said, "Well, we can get him elected if you want him elected, but we got to do it when we get back to Washington in November. We can't do it down here because we ain't got enough votes."

And he says, "Well, you better go to talk to Woods, and you better go talk to Fowler."

I went to see them. By the time I got to talking to them, he'd talked to both of them so I really didn't have much to tell them. You understand what I'm saying. Although he sent me to see the two of them; I saw them—of course, it took an hour or so to find both of them and catch up with them in the convention, but he'd gotten to them on the phone. We finally decided not to press it at all, and they all agreed and left it alone.

And then I went to Woods and said, "Now you stay another year," which he'd already done the year before, and I said, "This is just meaning you've got to stay a couple of more months now."

And he said, "No. It'll be six more months."

And I said, "Yes, it will, but that'll be the end of the year that you've agreed to stay longer, so it won't mess it up."

And then we came on back here. We did it on Tuesday meeting before Thanksgiving. And then I brought all Executive Directors to “tea and coffee.” I wasn’t involved now; don’t get that idea. I’m not on anybody’s payroll; I just came to the meeting, and they wanted to know what to do. And I said, “You’re going to have to vote on it. And you listen to what I want you to do.”

I sat down with all of them, almost individually because it was better than trying to talk to them on the thing. We couple of them we did talk together because they were a little more comfortable having a witness, is the best way to say it. And I told them, I said, “Don’t deal with your Foreign Office. If you can go direct to your heads of state, you go direct. If you can’t go direct to your head of state”—and some of them were Alternates, some of them had extra countries, and here was [Mohamed N.] Kochman with 20 countries, and he didn’t have any entre with any of his 20 countries because he was just the compromise Lebanese to look after all these 20 that were left over in Africa, but he didn’t have any entre with the leadership of those countries except they knew who he was and he sort of had an entre—I said, “You go back through the financial side, through the Treasury side, through the financial minister, and leave all the State Department people out of it and tell them that it’s going to be done over the Thanksgiving weekend.”

We brought them all in here and told them they could use all the telephones they wanted. There’d been a big question over budgets at that time as to how many calls they could make home. Some of them were running for the Presidency of Ecuador, and somebody was running for the President of Chile, and so forth. So you had those kind of idiosyncracies all going on, and the budget was real tight at this stage of the game about how many times they could call home and for what purposes they could call home.

And so they all followed my pattern pretty well, and they was elected. They notified so they could get the vote of the Governors to all get back in here. And with Thanksgiving a holiday, the Friday after Thanksgiving—because the Bank and Fund take American holidays type of thing, which was another one of my earlier statements.

The very earlier statement was on whiskey, voting for or against whiskey on the luncheon table. That was a big issue in the early days in both Bank and Fund. And it always came at the first meeting in November of the new Board, see, and then it lasted two years, the first meeting in November. So all of that had come through, and we’d had pretty good luck with most of these issues.

So kept it all quiet, got through ‘til Monday, and it was Tuesday to where the brother-in-law of the President of Ecuador, who was then the new ambassador from Ecuador to the Court of Saint James in London, finally got it to the press. And he was nothing in the world but sort of bragging on himself and his new job, didn’t realize what he was leaking, and it all got back here on Tuesday and nobody shirked on any side. Nothing shirked on Wednesday. Thursday was the day they announced it. And it was all set.

By that time Johnson had asked me to take care of Clark Clifford. The biggest question of getting Clark Clifford confirmed as Secretary of Defense was selling all his Delta Airlines stock, and therefore I was involved in being sure that we got that all sold without affecting

Delta's market because it was a pretty good sized block. And had to do all of that before the Secretary of Defense was all settled. And then actually William, public relations, bald, British fellow with a bad knee . .

**KRASKE:** Clark.

**COCKE:** Clark, William Clark. He, he's the one that finally picked out the day of April 1st, and it turned out to be his last day, it turned out to be Woods' last day, and it turned out to be McNamara's first day in '68.

**BECKER:** Did you, over the term of McNamara's tenure as President, did you have many contacts with him?

**COCKE:** Not too many contacts. I had very good relationships with Woods all while he was President; his whole six years I kept up with him. With McNamara I'd never had a very close relationship. I came over; I made a courtesy call on him. He of course knew a good bit about me. I had been involved--I'd made a couple of trips to Georgia with him in '61 and '62, mainly because they were tied to Senator Russell and they were tied to Congressman [Carl] Vinson and Defense-level positions and so forth. So we were not close personal friends.

I think the best one that's worth telling you that—I mentioned the trip to TVA. Well, I went to Black in December of . .

**[End Tape 1, Side B]**

**[Begin Tape 2, Side A]**

**COCKE:** . . taken them all to TVA and I'd taken them all up to New York to ECOSOC [United Nations Economic and Social Council] and a few things like that. This just tickled these old time Executive Directors because they had never been traveling at all. Staff traveled all the time; they never got to go anywhere—hardly to an Annual Meeting. So that was helpful.

And then the question came up about want to go to Ford Motor Company. And between Black's connections and my needling, we got Henry Ford II to invite us to all come out to Detroit, and we went out there. Election was on about the 2nd or 3rd of November and this was like the 5th or 6<sup>th</sup>, Thursday or Friday after election on Tuesday. So the first day we went out there and we heard all of the vice presidents all over the world for Ford come in and make their sort of annual type of speech, and then the next day we turned it around and took all my Executive Directors--we had a big boardroom in Detroit to where one day they sat in the chairs and the next day they sat around the chairs where the two groups were there in the same set of rooms. It was a very fine operation because we found out a great deal all over the world. And then they had a chance to by play between the Executive Directors and the thing. Took all the Alternates, too, which helped a great deal to spread it out. And it was a good session of understanding American business and to understand international geopolitics of a multipurpose institution like the Ford Motor Company all over the world.

Finally, we got down to the last session, and they all had some pretty sharp questions. Ford had come in for a luncheon, and he'd come in for a cocktail party. Arjay Miller was the president at that time, and he was my real communications man, and I said, "See if you can get Henry Ford to come to the question-and-answer session."

And he says, "Well, we'd like to have a few questions answered, too. It might be a good idea to let some of these people ask him some questions that those of us who work for him can't afford to ask him."

And I said, "Fine."

So he sold him on coming, and we asked all kind of, between the group. Lieftinck sort of handled that tutorial position of questions and so forth, and they asked some good ones, I'll have to admit.

Finally, they left me the one at the end, and I said now, to Henry Ford, "It certainly looks like that your predictions of 1960 were correct. You supported John Kennedy in 1960, and he was elected. And 1964 comes up, '63 is coming up"--Kennedy is not dead yet, this is November of '63—"what are your predictions?"

And he answered me very quickly. He says, "There's one thing about it. I supported him in 1960 and I'm just as strong for him in 1964."

And then I said, "My follow up question, Mr. Ford, is simply what are you going to do with Bob McNamara? Is Bob McNamara going to serve out?"

He says quickly, "He will serve out the next four years, finish this, and the whole eight years he will be Secretary of Defense."

And I said, "Well, then do you expect him to come back to Ford Motor Company? You know, he made more money working for Ford Motor Company the first 21 days of January 1961 than he will make as Secretary of Defense for the whole eight years."

And he then very, very studiously says, "Bob McNamara is doing a good job as Secretary of Defense. He's doing as good a job as Jack Kennedy is being President. I really don't expect him to ever come back to Ford. He is too judicial; he is too academic to where some great institution will probably make him president of that institution. I don't think Ford will be fortunate enough to ever have him back."

And that was the first time that he ever knew all of his connections at Ford were absolutely severed.

**BECKER:** Speaking about McNamara, as president of the Bank he took the Bank on a very different course from . .

**COCKE:** Entirely different. He started a different pattern of organization. He started a different pattern of structure, and all of a sudden you had all these vice presidents, you had all of the corporate structure and so forth.

**BECKER:** He changed it from a banking institution really into a development institution. What was your reaction to that?

**COCKE:** Well, it was different. Black always talked about economic diplomacy, wrote a book on it—or at least Nate [Nathaniel M.] McKittrick wrote a book on it, to be honest with you—but it was really McNamara who perfected economic diplomacy in the true sense. I'm well aware of that and didn't have any real input in that part of it.

I, of course, kept up with the Bank. I made most all of the Annual Meetings, certainly those here in Washington every year that they are here. I have missed a few at one time or another in the rest of the world. But I'm not the best one to really evaluate that question.

**BECKER:** Okay.

**KRASKE:** Did you ever visit any of the real poor developing countries? Did you have sort of an involvement . . .

**COCKE:** Oh, look, I was probably the most traveled Executive Director that you could imagine because with the—I could leave here on Thursday night and be back here Monday morning or even Tuesday morning if necessary. And with it, I went to all kinds of places. And particularly I know in '61 at the end of the Annual Meeting--the Berlin Wall had gone up in Berlin on the 13th of August '61--we finished the Annual Meeting, and Black turned to me early one morning at breakfast, and he says, "You got time to spend two or three days in Italy? I want you to go down and see that atomic plant. We may have some real problems with it." And so I went from Vienna down there. I went to South America on a trip like that. I saw lots of different places.

I particularly spent some time in London and in Paris. I thought both of those two offices were terribly expensive for the results that we got. And I made all of the early decisions that hotel rooms in London were too expensive and therefore we need to rent a flat and buy that flat. We bought that flat on Hill Street, South Hill Street, and had three sizes, three different levels on that. We kept it pretty well busy, but it saved us a fortune in terms of hotel bills in London because we always had somebody going there. And every Englishman, regardless of where the trip was, they went through London, either going or coming. If you went to South America, they still went through London, going or coming, I mean. And as a result I tried my best to watch the economy on it.

You've got to realize that I really wasn't the Executive Director as much as I was the inside operator of what needed to be done, and did it. I think that's the best way to say it.

**BECKER:** I think that's a good place to leave it. So thank you very much.

**COCKE:** Well, I don't know whether it did you any good or not, but . .

**BECKER:** I think it has.

**KRASKE:** It was very interesting.

**[End of Tape 2, Side A]**

**[End of interview]**