

THE WORLD BANK/IFC ARCHIVES

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Transcript of interview with

JAMES E. TWINING, JR.

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By: **John Muir**

The World Bank/IFC Oral History Program

Memorialist: James E. Twining, Jr.

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Interviewer: John Muir

MUIR: Today is May 2, 1985. My name is John Muir of the Oral History Program, and I have with me here at the headquarters of the World Bank, Mr. James E. Twining, Jr. Mr. Twining had a distinguished career in our institution that spanned more than three decades. He joined the Bank in 1950 as an assistant personnel officer. In 1951 he became assistant personnel manager. In 1960 he transferred to what was then called the Technical Assistance and Planning Department. He returned to the Administration Department in 1963, becoming its deputy director in 1964. In September 1971 Mr. Twining was appointed Director of the Administrative Services Department. He remained its Director until his retirement in May 1983.

Welcome back, Mr. Twining. Perhaps we can start by focusing on the subject of personnel management during the early years of the Bank. You began in the Bank as an assistant personnel officer. Could you describe the mechanics of personnel work in the Bank when you joined and also discuss its early evolution?

TWINING: Thank you, John. I certainly would be glad to. This is a two-part question. Let's deal with the mechanics first. It must be remembered that the Bank at the time I joined had, I think, 400 staff members, and the Personnel Division was a very small division in a relatively small Administration Department. The organizational units of the entire Bank at that time were small. The Division, as I knew it, had 11 people in it, and we were dealing with a total Bank staff of 40 times that. The mechanics of the operation were very much the way they are today, although very small in size. The personnel work was much more informal. There were many fewer rules. There were many fewer forms. The forms were rudimentary. We had at that time a black book, which became famous in the Bank on the operational side. Everything was put into black books. But our black book was the staff roster, and information was put in it by pen. So, if you wanted to see how many people there were in department X or department Y, you looked at the staff roster. There were very few policies.

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However, all of the essential tasks of good personnel work were included in the operation of the small Personnel Division that I first joined. We had recruitment and placement responsibilities. We had job classification; more later on that. We had salary policy. We had transfers of staff from one department to another. We had a termination policy, despite the fact that we were a very young organization. There were many staff relations problems in those early years. We had a health program which was operating very much the way it does today, except there was one person instead of a whole department. We hired a number of consultants for Bank missions, but these missions were missions to member countries. They were not resident missions. There were no resident missions at that time. There was a Paris Office, and later there would be a London Office for the IFC when it became an affiliate of the Bank. But the functions that personnel work requires were all performed in this small division in very much the same way that they're performed today. So my answer really is that the mechanics haven't changed all that much. They have improved in many ways, due to improvements in technology for one thing, but basically you're doing the same type of thing.

Back to the question of job classification. One of the first assignments I had given to me when I joined the staff was to be chairman of the so-called B-Committee. The B-Committee was the committee that was dealing with the classification of non-professional positions, and the company that had been hired by the World Bank to do this was Edward N. Hay and Associates. I know that when I left the Bank, Edward N. Hay and Associates were back here making another staff job classification, and I gather it's still going on and has not been concluded. I can just say that the one we did in 1950 and 1951--I think it started in 1951 actually--was never very well accepted. The results were suspect, I think, and, although we did reclassify jobs based upon the Edward N. Hay study, over the course of time that study was forgotten and changes were made in the classification without benefit of it. I hope that isn't the fate of the current study.

MUIR: If I may interject, according to Asher and Mason's study, the job classification system introduced by Vice President Robert L. Garner shortly after his arrival at the Bank was never completed. From the early 1950s until 1969 salaries were fixed without any clear or consistent relationship to formal titles. Does that sound correct?

TWINING: That's basically what it was. The staff began to grow on a steady upward course in the mid-1950s, after having declined from a high of approximately four hundred fifty to around four hundred in the early 1950s. But as the staff grew, of course, the Personnel Division grew as well and the informality that I referred to of the way we operated--the mechanics--became much more systematized.

The basic change, I think, which was required to deal with the increases in personnel questions and personnel problems, was that the early staff hired were people who you might refer to as jacks-of-all trade. They could do a little recruitment, they could do a little classification, and they could do a little salary administration. None was an expert in any one thing. What happened thereafter was that we began to hire people because of their specific expertise: persons who were experts in personnel administration, in the first place, and secondly, who had a particular skill in recruitment or in classification or in salary administration. We hired a placement officer, for example. We hired a training officer, which we had not had prior to that time. We created a consultant recruitment section because the hiring of consultants had taken so much of the time of the staff of the small division.

We refined, to a certain extent, the salary increase system that was in place. But the annual salary reviews, I think they're now called, at that time were called personnel reviews, and I remember very well that the Personnel Manager, who was Donald D. Fowler, and I would get from the supervisors of all of the professional and the non-professional staff their evaluations of their staff members, generally written in a very informal way. We would go over these with those supervisors, and agree on a position with respect to the performance of each staff member.

Then Mr. Fowler and I would sit down with none less than the Vice President, Mr. Garner, and go over all the professional staff evaluations. Mr. Garner would either comment on the evaluations in general, or he had something to say about the individuals. In most cases, of course, he simply accepted what we had agreed with the supervisor as to the rating of the individual. But in many cases he knew the persons well. He'd seen them behave in front of the Board, and he had his own ideas as to how they were performing. Sometimes that had an effect on the salary increase given to the staff member.

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Of course, in today's Personnel Department it would be unheard of to sit down with the Vice President. It's enough, I guess, that they do let the Vice Presidents know what's recommended in the departments, but I don't know how far up it goes.

One sidelight on the subject of personnel work in those days: this was, as you may or may not remember, the McCarthy era in the United States. Senator Joe McCarthy was a Communist-hater and had done a great deal to have laws passed to tighten security checks on Americans to keep Communists from getting jobs in international organizations. As a result of this, United States citizens who wanted to join the Bank had to be cleared by the State Department. We had to submit information to the U.S. State Department and wait until their investigative officers, whoever they were, gave the green light to hire Mr. X or Mr. Y, who was an American. Others who were hired in those days, whether they were Czechs or Poles--and both countries were members of the Bank at that time--could get on the staff of the Bank within ten minutes, or whatever time it took us to process them. But an American had to wait until he was cleared by his own government. This, of course, created a certain number of delays in recruitment, and it also made it difficult to staff missions, because you never knew whether the man you were hiring was going to get cleared, or wasn't going to get cleared, and secondly, how long it would take. It generally was taking six to eight weeks, so once you'd decided to hire Mr. X or Mr. Y you had to wait six to eight weeks before he could come on the payroll. It was a difficult time, and personnel work was made difficult because of it.

MUIR: Can I just ask you a question with regard to the annual review? You talked about evaluation of performance and determination of salary increase. Was there any discussion of that with the staff member in those days, or was that strictly a supervisory task?

TWINING: It was a supervisory task. The staff member, of course, had the opportunity, if he felt aggrieved because of the increase he'd been given, to appeal. But it was not in any way discussed with him in advance. There were no clear lines giving the staff member the opportunity to show what he had done during the year which, in his view, merited consideration for increases of higher than normal size. It was very largely from the top down.

MUIR: This was a concept that probably was only introduced in the early 1970s.

TWINING: The collegial concept, yes.

MUIR: I think we covered part two, or do you have more to add to the question?

TWINING: Well, part of two had to do with the typical staff member working in personnel-related matters when I joined. The Assistant Director of the Administration Department in those years was William F. Howell. Bill Howell was a graduate of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University, and he was very keen to get staff in the administration field who had professional qualifications, both academic and work-related. I guess I could be considered a typical hire for the Personnel Department at that time, and my background was very much like his. I have a B.A. in government and economics from Union College and an M.S. from Syracuse in the Maxwell School, and I had had four or five years in personnel work, both in the Federal Housing Agency and in the State Department. So I considered myself at the time a qualified personnel administrator. This is the kind of person that I think Howell encouraged to be brought into the Bank. Over the years more and more of the staff who were hired were professional personnel administrators or had professional experience in either general administration or in personnel.

MUIR: How was staff recruited when you joined? That is, did the Bank actively seek out recruits, or did they come to the Bank and ask to join?

TWINING: Recruitment in the early years was perhaps less difficult than it became later, and perhaps than it is today. The initiative was with the Bank. There was very little referral from, say, Board members or others who wanted to have their countrymen employed, or their relatives employed, or anything of that kind. But there was a large number of people who were applying to the Bank then, seeking employment from Europe where, as you know, conditions were such that there weren't as many opportunities for professional staff. So we had a large pool of candidates from which to choose. It was also difficult in those early years to find Americans who had foreign experience. Unlike the British and the French, who had large colonial empires that they had overseen in the years before the war--and were still doing at that time--America had few, and therefore the non-U.S. were better qualified to deal with the underdeveloped countries' problems than the Americans were.

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However, I think the Bank's standards were always very high. We had rather thorough interviews with any candidate at the Personnel Division level and with department heads. There were not so many of them, and the numbers of people being hired were not so numerous that it was not possible to get the highest level interview that you wanted. Very often department heads themselves did the interviewing and could decide even very low level positions in their departments. At the starting professional level the department head himself would take time to interview, which I doubt happens today. I think they might interview for those people close to their own level, but certainly they delegate to the division chiefs and others the right to interview and decide, with Personnel's approval, hiring today.

I made many recruitment trips in those days with department heads, especially to Europe. We would spend our time interviewing candidates in all of the countries. On one trip, in 1959, I was gone for a month-and-a-half. I went to nine different countries looking for staff in Europe; just back and forth from Italy all the way up to the Scandinavian countries and through Germany.

MUIR: For specific jobs, or just to find potential recruits?

TWINING: We always started out with a shopping list of specific jobs, but obviously you don't always end up finding the people you wanted for those jobs, so you would find others who suited other jobs. One sidelight I remember: I made an extensive recruitment trip one year with Sicm Aldewereld, who was later to become Vice President. At that time he was head of the Technical Operations Department, or whatever it was called. Many of our recruitment trips were organized by a local official of the member country government. They knew we were coming, they advertised for candidates, and they would organize the recruiting interview session. I remember in the U.K. it was a fellow called Sir George Gater, who had an office in the bowels of the Treasury. When I looked at my office in Washington and compared it to his, I was very happy I was in Washington. But he seemed happy enough with what he had.

In Germany our interviewing was always done around a large table, and there was the poor candidate who was led in almost on tether and sat in a chair. Then there was a whole bunch of government officials alongside, and then there were Aldewereld and I. After one or two of these trips, he said "I'm going to sit opposite you. I don't want to sit alongside of you when I interview. I'll let you

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know what I think of the candidate. If I put my hand on the table with a thumb up I think we ought to go on with interviewing, and if the thumb goes down forget it. Stop the interview as soon as you can." That was very successful. I mean, there wasn't any point in our both sitting there thinking this guy is a real dud and prolonging the agony of the interview for both him and for us. So we had signals of that kind which speeded things up.

We never had a quota system in the Bank, as people have often thought. But with American applicants so close at hand, it was difficult to keep the desired mix of staff. In those days I think the U.S. contributed almost fifty percent of the funds to the Bank. And so it evolved that there were far more Americans than any other nationality on the staff of the Bank. As the years have gone by that number has been dropping steadily. I think in those days the U.S. had maybe 55 percent of the staff members, the British followed with 17 percent, and the French with 6 and on down. But we did go out of our way--and all of the department heads and all of the managers who helped in the recruitment effort followed suit--to be sure that we had a mix of all nationalities. In a single department it was especially difficult. You didn't want to end up with a department which had predominantly one or the other nationality.

MUIR: Can I interject? You say approximately seventy percent were Americans and British. Would there have been an Anglo-Saxon bias in the Personnel Department because of the fact that there were a lot of Americans, let's say, in Personnel?

TWINING: Yes, I'm sure that this might have been considered. The Personnel Division in those days consisted of, as I said, 11 or 12--it began to grow rather rapidly--but there were more Americans than any other nationality in the Division. The whole Administration Department, I think, certainly had more Americans than it has today. But we were constantly reminded, if the rumors got too rampant that we were biased, that we couldn't be. This is why we spent so much of our time recruiting abroad. We wouldn't have had to do that. Even if we had advertised abroad and had gotten a lot of applications as a result of that advertising, we might have done fairly well at attracting non-Americans. But we went even further than that and we spent a fair amount of the Bank's money recruiting throughout Europe over those years. That was one of the reasons. It was partly because we needed the expertise that those people had, and the Americans particularly didn't have, but it was also because we realized we couldn't have as many Americans as we could pick up off the street easily.

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There was an old boy network that existed as well. The department heads were of several nationalities; they weren't predominantly American in those days. We got many of the Dutch because Aldewereld was a Dutchman; we got many of the British because S. R. Cope was a Briton, we got many of the French because Leonard Rist was a Frenchman. But we worked hard at that. It was difficult because, on the one hand, you had the department saying if we can't get our staff in a hurry we're not going to be able to make this many loans, and Mr. Black was pushing for an increase in the number of loans and Bank activity. On the other hand, if you went the easy way you ended up with Americans and British, because there were more of them available than other nationalities.

MUIR: Was there any attempt to recruit outside America and Western Europe?

TWINING: There was. The largest number that we tried to hire in those days outside of Europe and the U.S. was in South America. Of course, the Asian countries didn't produce a great many candidates with the kind of experience we wanted. All of the African countries were colonies of the large European countries, and they too lacked the academic training that we thought we needed. But there was an attempt made, and we had several recruitment missions to South America where we were able to hire a fair number of less developed country nationals.

MUIR: Were these policy decisions made at a high level or, let's say, from Mr. Fowler down?

TWINING: It's hard to say. I'm sure that these were discussed at high levels, and it was passed on to us. But, as I say, all of the department heads were very much aware of the desirability of having an international staff. It really didn't have to be dictated. It was something that was more or less inherent in the job.

MUIR: It's been said that the introduction of the professional and the non-professional categories did much to undermine the initial cohesiveness and morale of the staff, especially, of course, the morale of the non-professional staff. Could you give us some background on the process by which this distinction was introduced?

TWINING: As far as I remember, there was always a distinction between the professional and the non-professional. I don't remember it being introduced in any way. I believe that it always existed. I think, however, the distinction, which later became a problem--and which has largely, I guess, now been overcome by various methods--was no problem for the early Bank. The Bank under Mr. Black, especially, was almost a family-style operation. Everyone knew almost everyone else. There was very little of the attitude of servant and master. I think that probably had more to do with the harmony than anything else, but I think that the distinction between professional and non-professional was always understood in fact, as I mentioned earlier.

When the Edward N. Hay Associates came, their grading exercise was divided into two classes. There was the A-Committee that dealt with the so-called higher level, or I guess professional, and there was the B-Committee that dealt with all others: the secretaries, the clerks, the messengers, those who, I suppose, would then have been considered non-professional.

I was thinking back as to what resulted from this distinction and I, for the life of me, can't think of any specific problem that arose. Of course, we had no Staff Association in those days. The pay for all jobs was relatively high in comparison with the pay that you could get on the outside. It wasn't until the Bank began to grow by leaps and bounds, in the mid-sixties and on, that this became a significant problem. But I'm sure that people were considered professional or non-professional, and the distinction was there and you lived with it.

MUIR: Of course, there's been a large increase in the number of women in the market place recently. This may have had some impact on that. Could you describe the role of women in the Bank, especially in terms of the recruitment, or promotion to higher level positions in the early days.

TWINING: Well, women always were large in numbers in the Bank. For almost every staff member that was engaged I think there was a secretarial position, and in those days there were very few, if any, male secretaries. So we had a cadre of large numbers of women almost from the very beginning. Those women who had what you can call professional status in those days were very largely in the non-operational side of Bank activities. The Administration Department had a number. The Public Relations Department had a number. There were one or two lawyers. The Controller's Department

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had some. But, by and large, the operational departments had none. In Personnel, for instance, when I first came to the Bank, there were only two males. One was Mr. Michael Lejeune, a Briton--an American actually, but he was born in Britain--and Yann LeRoux who was a Frenchman. All the rest were women. It wasn't really until the last year or so of Mr. Woods' presidency, and all through Mr. McNamara's reign, that women were sought for operations, and that in the recruiting formula, in addition to continuing the mix of nationalities, you had women.

In addition to that, there has since been another element and that is the less developed country nationals, especially newly emerged African countries. But in the early years, and before that expansion, there was really not too much effort made to find professional positions for women. I think the first lady to reach department head status was probably Shirley Boskey in the Development Services Department, and I guess the first lady to make it to Vice President was Anne Krueger, who was just recently appointed a Vice President from outside. None has been promoted to Vice President. But there were always in Administration, the Marjorie Billingses and the Lacy Carters, and when I got there Mrs. Geib, who was head of Staff Relations, who was the Lacy Carter of her time, and so forth. We've never had a shortage of women, quote, "professionals," on the administrative side of the Bank.

MUIR: Here again, were there any clear policies set out in terms of quotas? Was there any feeling that perhaps on the operational side there could be prejudice against female economists, loan officers, project officers in the field on mission?

TWINING: Certainly, to my knowledge, there was never any directive issued which said either you must or you mustn't have a female in your department, in your division, or what have you. There clearly was an effort made, and it was a clearly understood effort, to attract women to the Bank. I remember sitting in meetings with the Director of Administration in which the numbers of women that had been hired in the past month was a subject of discussion. Why was it only 11? Why didn't we hire 15, or something like that? But in terms of a specific quota, I never remember there being one, any more than I remember there being a specific quota for less developed countries or other minorities. I think the Bank was careful, and has always been careful, to recruit the kind of people it needs, and if emphasis is given at any given moment to this type or that type, so be it.

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There is an effort made to attract candidates, but without any imposed quota, and no department head, to my knowledge, was ever told you have to take this person because he or she is a minority, or we're on a big drive to increase the number of this type or that type on the staff. I can't speak for what the Personnel Department has been since about 1971, when I left it, but I would guess that they have never had a quota either. Everything I've said applies to that time from 1950 to 1971. Thereafter I recruited only for my own department, with the help of Personnel. I know what we did. We didn't go out of our way to find a specific color or sex or anything else for the department.

MUIR: Let's try and wrap up on Personnel. Do you have any feelings as to how, during your period in Personnel, the Division or Department, was perceived by the rest of the staff, and did that perception change when you suddenly became a user of Personnel services?

TWINING: I think that the Personnel Division, when it was a small division within the Administration Department in the very early years of my career, was looked upon as a very helpful and essential administrative aid to the growing Bank. Department heads, Vice Presidents, the President, were all fairly generous in their praise of what the Personnel Division, small as it was, could do, and was doing. I think, as the Bank grew and as the Personnel Division grew, finally to become a department as you know, some of that gloss wore off, and there was a change, especially after the Staff Association came into being. I'm sure there had always been in the Bank staff members who felt the Personnel Division was not entirely objective in its approach to salary administration, in its approach to determining starting salaries, in its approach to internal reassignments, probably in its approach to terminations that were forced. But it wasn't really until the early days of the Staff Association that there was a move to force Personnel to reveal how it did its work, and how it determined what salaries were going to be, and why the cost of living should be X and the salary increase be Y. It wasn't until then, I think, that the real gloss that I always felt was on the personnel function in the Bank began to tarnish.

If I remember correctly, the Staff Association began its life when I was Deputy Director of the Administration Department and then it continued during the time I was Director of Administrative Services. I think that those days were difficult days, not because of the existence of the Staff Association, but they were difficult days anyway for the administration in the Bank. That was the era

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of tremendous growth and the administrative staff, including Personnel, were very busy people and they, I feel, had the sense that here was an annoyance: the Staff Association, a staff union. If they would just go away and let us continue what we'd been doing so well things would be all right. We were much too busy, I guess, to really work hard to face up to this new situation.

But I think prior to that time, in answer to your specific question, that the personnel function and the personnel team were looked upon very favorably, as helpful and trying their best to do what they had to do, with obvious minor exceptions. People who were fired were unhappy with it, and those who didn't get the salary increases they thought they should get were unhappy, and those who were assigned to some places they didn't want to be assigned were unhappy, and that's inevitable. But I would guess that it wasn't until the years either just prior to or after the creation of the Staff Association that the personnel function was looked upon as a little bit less than helpful, and in some cases suspect.

MUIR: In retrospect, do you think the Staff Association affected the evolution of the Personnel Department, and was it in a positive way; did it come up with ideas that, in fact, pushed Personnel in the right direction, or not?

TWINING: Yes, I think history will show that the creation of the Staff Association was a useful thing. It's funny. In the Fund there was a Fund Staff Association almost from the very beginning. It became rather dormant at about the time the Bank's Staff Association was becoming very active. But I remember we used to sympathize with our colleagues in the Fund Personnel Division that they were dealing with this band of unionites who were trying to force the Fund to do things that the Fund administration knew very well they didn't want to do. But I think probably the Staff Association was a helpful thing. Whether it could have been introduced in a less antagonistic way, I don't know. But, I think, in the end it probably did make Personnel stop and look at its procedures and its policies.

Of course, a big problem with the Staff Association and Personnel was the fault of neither. It was a management decision as to whether we would pay X or Y dollars, and it was a management decision as to whether the cost of living increase would be the full cost of living increase or a portion of it. In many cases it was a management decision as to what groups would be transferred to what, and what departments would be created out of what departments, and all of these issues that the Staff

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Association then were forced to take up on behalf of the staff were above the Personnel/Staff Association negotiation. It was something that neither could do much about. And, of course, I think a great many of the senior staff, including Mr. McNamara himself, had many confrontations with the Staff Association. I know that he had regular meetings with them, and he at least listened to what they had to say.

I, as a Department Director, had regular meetings with the Staff Association. We would have a formal agenda, and they would come and meet with us and discuss the items on the agenda. We would agree or disagree on things that they recommended be done. In those cases, the Staff Association was generally acting as the spokesman for a small group, maybe the printers, or maybe the messengers, or maybe the chauffeurs, and it was not global. It was not a Bank-wide issue. The travel policy was one with which we had many, many rounds with the Staff Association and, there again, while we had the opportunity to make recommendations as to what the travel policy should be, there were certain limits imposed by management and decisions taken by management, correct or incorrect, that carried the day. And the Staff Association had to live with that. It was a difficult time, but what they achieved was to get all of the departments of the Bank who dealt with the conditions of life for the staff as a whole, to think carefully about issues that had a serious effect on the way people behaved in the institution. Maybe we didn't do enough of that before the Staff Association came along.

MUIR: You used the term management, as opposed to Personnel. Are you suggesting that management might have contradicted some of the recommendations or advice of the Personnel Department?

TWINING: Oh, yes, surely. By management I mean a Vice President sitting on top of a group of departments. There is of course, big management: the President. But let's assume that management is the Vice President. There were a number of cases where the Vice President asked the Personnel Department, or the Administration Department prior to that, to come up with a proposal for X or Y: salary increase for the year, or a new method for integrating returning field mission staff--I don't know what it might be--and Personnel, after much thought, would come up with a proposal. Then management would say go back to the drawing board. I don't like that proposal, or for this or that reason it's not possible to do it that way, or I've checked with the President and he won't have it that way, or whatever. So Personnel, or any other department, might be conversing with the Staff Association.

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In the days when the Staff Association became well established, and when we were holding nothing back, we would put it on the table what we were thinking of proposing. If it were the travel policy, we would put it on the table when we discussed with the Staff Association: well we're thinking of letting people use business class, and we're still going to cut back on first class, but business class will be more or less the norm. You won't always have to go economy. And the Staff Association would know we were doing that, and then we'd come back the next week and say, suddenly, we're not going to have business class, we're going to stick with economy. I don't know if that ever actually happened in that way. I use it only as an example of what happened with several of the proposals that were made at the departmental level. When they reached the management level, the Vice President and sometimes the President, you had to revise the proposals for reasons which maybe were good, maybe were bad.

MUIR: During the period 1950 to 1971, do you feel that the Personnel Division or Department had just about the right amount of influence on personnel decisions in the Bank?

TWINING: Yes, I do. Again, the larger the Bank grew, and the more complex the rules, and the more forms, and the more policies, the more difficult it was for the Personnel Division to have its own way about how things were going to run, and the more advice it got from outside itself. The line becomes fuzzy as to where the influence came from: whether it came from the Personnel Division, whether it came from the Director of the department, whether it came from some outside group who had a grievance. But I think there are two periods: the period prior to the creation and the ascendancy of the Staff Association and the period subsequent to it. There's a division there. But I think it was worthwhile. I don't think the Staff Association was a bad thing. I think it took a while for the management to learn that they had to live with the Staff Association. I think in the early years of the Staff Association they probably went too far too fast. They tried to get the World Bank's world changed too quickly. They had a series of good and bad leaders sitting in the Staff Association Chair, as you probably had in the staff itself in the departments. But, if you take it all together, I think it was probably a useful thing. I remember being very annoyed at the Staff Association from my perspective and wishing they'd go away. It was easier to run the department or division without a Staff Association. But it was probably a good thing.

MUIR: As a final question, do you have any reflections on any key personalities or characters in Personnel during those years who you think may have cast their identity on the division and the institution?

TWINING: I would probably have to think a little bit about that. In fact, I can tell you a little sidelight. I was working in the State Department as a personnel officer in the Office of Foreign Service. I had a telephone call asking if I would like to come over to be interviewed for a position in the World Bank. I didn't even know what the World Bank was, I must admit. But I said, sure. Being an old personnel man myself, I knew you never turned down an opportunity to go and be interviewed for another job that might be the key to all your success. So the interview was set up for twelve o'clock, and they told me where the building was. I was to go to the twelfth floor in the A building. At that time the Fund and the Bank were both occupying the same top five, or six, or seven, or eight floors of the A building. And I arrived there at 12:00, and I went into this room. It was a very small room, and it had an array of maybe three desks. On top of each desk was one of these big brown boxes with toggle switches, which was the telephone system. Beside each toggle switch was a light which blinked when the phone rang, and it kept blinking until you pulled the toggle switch and made the connection. But there was nobody in this room. It was 12:00 and I sat down and I waited. It got to be 12:15 and nobody showed up. All of a sudden all of the lights on all of these boxes on all the desks lit up almost at the same time. The telephone bells were ringing and ringing. All of a sudden this door opened and this fellow came sort of stumbling out. "Where in the hell are all the secretaries"? That was Yann LeRoux. He was, at that time, the only other professional male in the Personnel Division, and he'd obviously been having his siesta. So my introduction to the Bank was one of surprise because, first of all, there was no secretary in sight, the phones were not being manned, and the only person there had been asleep. Yann was a bit of a character, and he eventually went to become the administrative officer in the Paris Office.

MUIR: Does that cover Personnel?

TWINING: I think that takes us at least as far as your questions went on Personnel. When I look back on my career it's in two parts. Personnel was one and everything else was the other. It was just about mid-way of the 34 years. I spent ten in the Personnel Division and then three in Technical Assistance and another one back in Personnel and several as deputy director with Personnel under me, and then the rest--from 1971 onward--was all in Administrative Services. My career in Personnel really ended in 1971.

MUIR: For about four years you worked in what was called the Technical Assistance and Planning Department. Could you describe your role there?

TWINING: Yes. Actually, when I joined it I think it was called Technical Assistance and Planning Staff. The Director was Richard H. Demuth, who was a lawyer by profession, but he was one of the most influential men in the Bank in the period of time that he was in it. He was an innovator. He first headed what was called a Staff Office, and if you look at the organization chart it was on a line with what now would be Vice Presidents or at least department heads, but it never became anything but a Staff Office until later. I think it was probably between 1946 and 1948. I'm talking about an office that had departmental rank. But he was always called an advisor to the President, or he had some titles other than Department Director, until the Development Services Department was formed in 1961. The Technical Assistance and Planning Staff, and later the Development Services Department, was very much a creation of Dick Demuth's. He had the vision to know that the Bank's activity was going to be something other than just making loans to member countries, that there was a whole area of need in the less developed countries that had to be filled, and that the way to fill it was to provide technical assistance. He also, I think, was given credit for conceptualizing the IFC [International Finance Corporation] and also the EDI [Economic Development Institute]. So there were two large offshoots of the Bank that Demuth was very much involved in during the early days.

When I joined the Technical Assistance and Planning Staff my primary duty, with some others including David Gordon, was to provide technical assistance and training to Bank and later IDA [International Development Association] member countries. Whenever we had a request which asked for advice rather than money, it came to the Technical Assistance and Planning Staff; at one time it seems to me it may have been called Technical Assistance and Liaison. I think the reason I had been selected by Demuth to move from Personnel to this Staff, was because much of the work of getting consultants to take these technical assistance assignments was a recruiting function. You had to find them. Although there was a technical assistance recruitment unit in the Personnel Department--and in fact it was there from the time that we were recruiting for the Technical Bureau of the Plan Organization--they were so busy hiring consultants for Bank Resident Missions or Bank lending missions that there was a gap. I think Demuth recognized that, in order to make a viable technical assistance and planning effort, we had to have help to recruit these technicians and consultants. So that was primarily my function.

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When the Development Services Department was created, it really encompassed two units: the Technical Assistance and Liaison Staff, or whatever it was called, and the Development Advisory Service. Demuth, I think, at that time also had EDI reporting to him up the line, and I think the European Office reported to him. So he had a very sizable department when it finally achieved departmental status. My role in the Development Services Department was not unlike my role when it was the Technical Assistance and Planning Staff. It was to plan for technical assistance. I accompanied Bank operational officers to Syria, to the Philippines, and to Iran at one time, to discuss with the member countries what kind of technical assistance they were really looking for, how it related to terms of reference of the Development Advisory Service, and then, after having that clarified, to help the Personnel Division--it was still a division of the Administration Department in those times--recruit the necessary staff, and in some cases do the recruitment ourselves. It was a broader responsibility, as far as I was concerned, than simply doing the personnel work involved, because I was invited in the early stages of planning to decide what the technical assistance ought to consist of. That was an enlargement of responsibilities that I had had up to that time in the Bank. But it was a logical extension of my personnel work because the recruitment was very much a part of getting technical assistance to the member countries.

MUIR: Turning now to your years in ADM [Administrative Services Department], I would like first to focus on the impact of some key figures. Could you discuss Mr. William Howell's role in the development of the Administration Department, as it was then called.

TWINING: Well, let me first of all say that the man who was Director of Administration when I first joined the Bank was a fellow called Chauncey Parker. I don't know if anybody else has talked to you about Chauncey Parker, but Chauncey Parker had been a banker and good friend of Mr. [Eugene] Black's. He joined Black early on in Black's career as President, and was named Director of Administration. He'd been a member of a law firm which was the Washington firm Parker & Redpath, and had been, I think, a former Marine Corps general, or certainly a colonel. Bill Howell was his deputy. Subsequently, Chauncey Parker went to join Mr. [John J.] McCloy, a former Bank President, in Germany, when McCloy was named High Commissioner. That left the Administration Department position open, and Mr. Howell was appointed the Director. But when I first came Parker was still here, and he remained for some time after I came.

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Bill Howell played a very significant role in increasing the importance and the competence of the Administration Department. He was a very laid-back kind of a fellow, who would listen to anybody who wanted to speak to him. He was very easy to approach. He was a sensible man with a good academic background, and a lot of experience in the Federal Government before he came to the World Bank.

Let me go back and tell you about the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. This was a school which was formed in about 1924 to train city managers. And city managers, we learned, were very often called upon to run cities when there was a depression or when things weren't going very well. But as soon as the cities had money, and had no problems of that kind, they reverted quickly to the mayor and council form of government. They weren't interested in the city manager. The city manager was supposed to be an efficiency expert. He knew how to get things done with the least amount of money. But, by the time I got there, it was clear that Mr. Roosevelt was increasing the size of the Federal Government by leaps and bounds, and it was pretty clear to almost everybody that we were going to eventually be in the war. So a city managership was no longer considered an avenue of employment for Maxwell School graduates. We used to ask the Dean at Syracuse how we went about getting a job in Washington and there were several names suggested as contacts. One was Bill Howell. At that time he was in the Civil Service Commission. So I'd known Bill Howell before I ever came to, or even heard of, the World Bank. He was very understanding. He took the time to find out what was really behind the staff member's complaint, if it was a complaint, or to find out how he or the Department could help in any way. There weren't too many in the Bank in those days who were like that; so he was unique. His ambition was to improve the caliber of the Department, and yet he had inherited a fair number of people who had come over in many cases just on loan. I think Eddie [Edward J.] Donovan might have come over on loan. Bill [William] McCorkle certainly came over from the Treasury Department on loan, and several others had. Bill had this group of people, not any one of which he wanted to fire, but he still wanted to get new people who would not have the image of American civil service, which so many of the earlier people almost inevitably had, because when the Bank was formed that's where they turned to get the initial staff. I think he did a good job of this. He also improved the techniques that we were using.

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The thing that he did best, I guess, for Administration was to improve the image of the Department. For reasons that I'm not sure I understand, administration departments generally have a fairly low image, not in terms of the people and their capabilities, but in terms of their role. If you're an operations man, or if you're an economist, or if you're even nowadays a computer expert, you have a certain image and a certain place in any organization. But administrators--forgetting management as administration, which it really is--have a tendency to be less glamorous.

Bill was always in the forefront of those who were trying to upgrade not only the staff of the department, but also its image and the influence it had on management. He was supported very much in this by [Robert L.] Garner, who had been an administrator in the General Foods Corporation, and by Black, who had always been a banker but who also recognized what Bill was trying to do. I would say that of all the people I worked for in the Bank, including those that I worked immediately under, Howell was by far the person I admired most.

Unfortunately, as you know, he died suddenly at about age 56, but he was just a wonderful fellow. He had a lot of common sense about him, and he was not afraid to admit that what he was suggesting might not be found in a book, might not be in the pages of the Syracuse manual, but it was the best way to go. I can't say enough about Howell and his contribution to the Bank, and to me, and to everybody else that his career touched. Don Fowler was a very good friend of Bill Howell. Don also was a graduate of Syracuse and the Maxwell School. On the other side of the street Ken Clark, who eventually became the Director of Administration, but at that time was head of Personnel of the Fund, was also a Syracuse graduate, so there were a lot of Bill Howell's proteges floating around in these international organizations at that time.

MUIR: How would you characterize the impact and influence of the Vice Presidents who successively had charge of ADM: Messrs. Garner, [Sir Geoffrey] Wilson, [Mohamed] Shoaib, [Bernard] Chadenet, and [Martijn] Paijmans?

TWINING: I can tell you what my views are. Well, there's one that you left out. He was not a Vice President at the time but, [Aron] Broches, when he was General Counsel, was named to sit over the administration complex. I knew Mr. Garner perhaps less well than I've known the Vice Presidents since his time, simply because I was lower on the totem pole at the time he was Vice President. I

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know that his influence on the Bank was very strong. Mr. Black used Mr. Garner as his chief of staff. Mr. Black held the title, and Mr. Black sat in the chair at the Board, and Mr. Black made the important decisions, but Garner ran the Bank. You only went to Mr. Black when Mr. Garner wanted you to, or felt that this was something of great interest to Black and he should let Black deal with it. He had an abiding interest in administration. He was especially interested, I think, in personnel management. Whether this came from his experience in General Foods or whether it was just what he saw in the Bank when he joined--which was maybe a year or so before I joined--I don't know. But he was most interested.

I think I mentioned when we were talking about salary increases in those days, and how we went about salary administration, that Garner was a very busy man. Even though the Bank was only then working its way up toward a thousand people, he was, in effect, doing everything that many Vice Presidents do today. And yet, he took the time, and had a great interest in, sitting down with two people from Personnel, much below his level, and going over word for word the personnel evaluations of the professional staff. He didn't touch the so-called non-professional staff at that time. But he certainly had an interest in it to that extent, and he knew so many of them by name and by performance that he could make a real contribution to deciding whether this man was ready for this much of an increase or that much of an increase, or ought to stay where he was and he had very definite views about the way the professional staff was behaving.

MUIR: Did all staff know that he was doing this?

TWINING: Oh, yes. It was not a secret.

MUIR: So it had an impact on their morale that he was involved in their careers?

TWINING: Sure, right. I think they all respected him for it, even though it took a lot of his time, and I think some of them felt that it was wrong because he couldn't have known how well they did as much as the department head knew. Nevertheless, they knew that he was doing this. This carried over then when he became President of IFC. I remember well the first time we went to visit Garner, who then had a presidential tag and not a vice presidential tag, to discuss salaries of IFC staff, many of whom he'd recruited from the Bank staff and others he'd gone out and recruited independently. Suddenly,

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whereas he was fairly conservative in giving salary increases in the Bank, when we went to him with the same procedure with IFC he was willing to go all out. These people were the best he'd ever seen. They were all going to be making the IFC the best organization going and, in fact, one day I think I remember that Don Fowler and I went to see Garner about IFC salaries and he was recommending such big jumps, and we were getting more and more annoyed because he hadn't done that before. We weren't even recommending these jumps. Finally, he turned to us and he said, "You guys must think I'm crazy." We said, "Yes, frankly, we do." But he still had that strong interest in the administration of the staff under him.

The Vice President whom I knew least well, and who had a relatively short Bank career, was Geoffrey Wilson. I can't remember the precise dates but I think probably when Garner left to become President of IFC, Black, or certainly Woods after him, began to create more positions for Vice Presidents. That's when the switch took place. We got away from the single Vice President, chief of staff type of organization, and we had a number of Vice Presidents created. Geoffrey Wilson, I think, was brought in as a Vice President, but I'm not sure of that fact. Whether he came as a high level person in operations first or not, I don't remember. He had a relatively short Bank career. He expressed a lot of interest in Admin., especially during the period after Bill Howell died. Mike Lejeune was named to succeed Bill Howell and Raymond J. Goodman, who had been the deputy under Howell at the time of his death, was still deputy under Lejeune. At that time Wilson seemed to have a lot of interest. He was a good friend of Ray Goodman's and they worked together well, and he could speak to him, I think, even better than he had been able to speak to Bill Howell. But when Ray Goodman was not appointed Director of Administration after Bill's death--and I don't know the ins and outs of why he wasn't--I think Ray was disappointed and asked to be let go back to operations, from whence he'd come. I don't remember whether he became a Director of a department, or an assistant director of an operational department. I think maybe he worked for Peter Cargill as an assistant director.

When Lejeune, who had taken over for Howell, asked me to take over for Ray Goodman, Geoffrey Wilson's interest in the department was already on the wane. While we worked with him very much the way we had worked with Garner, in the sense that we put out the same kind of proposals and so forth, he didn't have the strong interest in it that Garner had. In fact, I remember Wilson at the time I became Deputy Director of Administration as being quite critical of Administration. Of course, then I got to know him more because I was closer to that level and when Lejeune was away I was

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running the Department. Instead of being rather supportive, as Bill Howell had been, he tended to criticize us for things we didn't do the way he thought they should be done. Or if someone outside of the administrative hierarchy was critical, Wilson was very often supportive of that criticism. This made it a little difficult to work under him. I don't remember the dates but I do recall that it was a fairly short time that Wilson was in charge of Administration. Again, I didn't go back to research this, but it seems to me that there was a hiatus between the time of Wilson's departure and the time that Broches was named, as a subsidiary duty of General Counsel, to oversee the Administration Department. During that hiatus, Lejeune and I reported directly to President Woods. There was a string of some Vice Presidents to which department heads reported, and far over on the right-hand side of the organization chart were two departments, Administration and Program Evaluation and Control, reporting directly to the President.

Then the next person to whom we reported was Ronnie Broches. He was General Counsel and not a Vice President at that time. Woods was the one who decided that Admin. should report through Broches, and I think he may have said, at the time that he assigned us to do that, that it was an interim measure. He didn't have the time to spend dealing with these matters. I think at that point the budget people, John Williams perhaps--I think it was Williams then, or [John H.] Adler, I don't remember exactly--reported up through another channel, through the accounting side. We reported to Broches. Broches served in this role for a couple of years, how many I'm not sure. He was a lawyer. He really had no great interest in administration. I think he thought it was a burden that someone had put on his shoulders to take on this role. However, he had a great interest in architecture, and in the course of his supervising us we completed the D building. In fact, we began and finished the D building and we also built the Paris Office building during the time we reported to Broches. So he had two buildings to sort of play with, while supervising Administration. For part of that time Lejeune continued to be the Director. Then, while Broches was still sitting over us, Hugh Ripman was nominated by Woods to succeed Lejeune, and I remained Deputy Director.

I remember Ronnie wanting to go to Italy with the architects to select the marble that was going to go on the facade of the D building, and they took several trips to a quarry outside of Rome. They inspected the marble, and they were shown how they were quarrying it and how it would be cut and how it would be numbered. Then, when we were doing the Paris building, we had a French architect, and Ronnie took many a trip to Paris to see how it was going and made some suggestions about how it should look.

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This was a very difficult building, as you may know. Washington has terribly strict height and architectural limitations because of it being a capital city, and they don't want it to be too different. But Paris is far worse. There you could hardly touch a stone without getting, as far as I know, the whole National Assembly to approve it.

Hugh Ripman also enjoyed the job of "supervising" the construction of the Paris building and he used to visit once a week. He'd get on the plane Thursday night and spend all day Friday in Paris, and he'd get on a plane Saturday night and come home. This went on for months while that building was being built. I think I took one or two trips when Ripman was busy doing something else and he sent me in his place.

But I would characterize Ronnie Broches as having a general interest in administration, not a very specific one. He enjoyed the building program that we were embarked on, had very many ideas about how it ought to look and how it ought to be divided up, and he was delighted to have the Paris Office come up while he was in that role. But I think he was also delighted when he was relieved of the responsibility for supervising Administration, which he was when Mr. McNamara came.

After Broches, there was [Mohamed] Shoaib .

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. For a long while he was just Vice President--it wasn't stated what he did--and then, suddenly, McNamara had the idea that we should report directly to Shoaib. There was also a hiatus between Broches' being relieved of that job and Shoaib taking it on, and then we reported directly to McNamara. But McNamara was far too busy raising money and parcelling it out and increasing the staff, and increasing the member country missions and increasing lending to worry about Administration. Shoaib was not a professional public administrator, although I suppose as Finance Minister he must have had a fairly large cadre of

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people to be responsible for and to administer in some fashion. It was during Shoaib's tenure in charge of Administration that the decision was taken to divide Administration into three parts: Administrative Services, Personnel, and Organization and Planning. He continued to have the three Department Directors report to him for a short while after that decision was taken.

MUIR: Do you know who made that decision?

TWINING: McNamara. As far as I know, it was not even recommended to him by anybody. Shoaib might have been consulted and might have said this is the best way to go, but my recollection of it was that McNamara, who was making quite a number of organizational changes at that time, decided that the Administration Department had just gotten much too large, that it was too big for any one or two people to handle. Anyway, McNamara had certain elements of administration that he was interested in and others that he wasn't. I think he wanted personnel to be separate because that was one thing that he had an interest in. Shortly after that split, Bernard Chadenet succeeded Shoaib. In fact, it probably happened when Shoaib retired. It just seems to me there might have been a period when Shoaib stayed on--whether in a special capacity or not, I don't know--after Chadenet took over. I'm sure Shoaib was already over the retirement age by that time. I think McNamara had kept him on even though he was at mandatory retirement age. But he didn't stay long after Chadenet took over.

Chadenet was an engineer by training. We didn't seem to find any more trained administrators after Garner. We had a lawyer, and we had a Finance Minister. I don't know what Geoffrey Wilson was in the U.K. civil service. In fact, Chadenet had headed the Technical Operations Department before he became Vice President in charge of Administration. Aldewereld had been promoted to Vice President over this whole complex and Chadenet and [Warren C.] Baum were running the Technical Operations Department under him. He was very interested in administration, and he worked hard at it. He was anxious to have recommendations made to him about what should and shouldn't be done. He listened to these recommendations very carefully. He may or may not have sought outside advice. I suspect in many cases he did. By that I mean he discussed it with McNamara, or discussed it with some of his other senior colleagues before he gave us his blessing or not on things we proposed. He was a very benevolent, kind man who would listen to you, and even though he disagreed with what you were recommending, he would give you plenty of time to try to persuade him.

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This was a new organizational structure that Chadenet was running. Shoaib didn't run it long enough to make it run smoothly or make changes. The single Administration Department which included such things as planning and organization computing, and so forth, was one thing and then suddenly he had three, and he had three department heads under him, so it was different. Mr. Chadenet's troubles, if he had troubles, began again with the creation and the increasing influence of the Staff Association. He had a series of Staff Association Chairmen who, in the beginning, were very good. I think Jim Chaffey was one of the early ones, perhaps the first, and Bengt Sandberg was another one. Then he had one or two who were not so good in the sense of taking a reasonable approach to getting this thing to work. Bernard, I'm sure, lost many a night's sleep over meetings that we had with the Staff Association, partly because he knew that this was something that was encouraged, and whose time had come. Almost all of the early, quote, "problems" that the Staff Association addressed to management were addressed to the administrative side of the Bank, whether it was the travel policy or fair treatment in salaries, or job classifications, or space and why they moved so much. All of these were issues that the Staff Association initially put on the table, which we were dealing with anyway, theoretically, but which they wanted input to. And, of course, here was Bernard, for the first time running all these departments and he had to take on the confrontation.

Bernard certainly gave it his all, and he was an easy person to work with, and he tried his best to be fair to all sides. Perhaps he tried too hard. The Staff Association, I think, went away from many meetings thinking that this man was weak, because he wouldn't pound the table and say, "No, we're not going to do it that way, no matter what you do. Go on strike, or whatever you're threatening to do." He tried negotiation. But sometimes that didn't work, and he still wouldn't be very firm about it. So the Staff Association would leave a meeting thinking he said yes, and in fact he said possibly, maybe, and he meant no. That type of negotiation doesn't make anybody feel very good. But I enjoyed working with Bernard. I think that he had a lot to offer the Bank. Maybe he was not the best choice to be head of this complex, but I don't know what McNamara's choices were, so I can't say that he might have found a better one.

Paijmans, I would just as soon not comment on. I'll leave it to others to characterize his contribution to the Bank. Maybe it's too soon for me to tell you what I think of Paijmans, and maybe I don't know what I think of him until I see how some of his plans turn out.

MUIR: Maybe you would comment on the fact that, if I remember correctly, Bernard Chadenet had no, or very few, assistants, whereas Martijn Paijmans has a rather large cadre. How do you characterize that change. Is that a style question, do you think, or a need?

TWINING: Well, I'm sure it's a style, but I'm also sure Mr. Paijmans feels it to be a need. Bernard Chadenet had a great deal of confidence, or gave the appearance of having a great deal of confidence, in his Department Directors. He would rely on the Directors to do the necessary staff work, or have their staff do the necessary work, and he would listen patiently to the proposals he received, and between the Director and himself they would resolve these issues. Paijmans has very definite views about how everything is going to be done. But, in order to be sure that he has the necessary knowledge, he has to surround himself with a large number of people, each of whom has a little role to play, whether it's a man who's going to keep his eye on administration, and a man who's going to keep his eye on personnel, and a man who's going to keep his eye on computing, and another one who's going to be keeping his eye on planning. So Martijn found it desirable to have Tony [Antony P.] Cole as his chief of staff, or whatever he was. He had someone on the staff morale side, a succession of them in fact. I think they were all psychologists, I'm not sure. Plus, he relied on his lower level staff to be his eyes and ears as well. This, I think, speaking personally, gives one the feeling that he didn't trust his department heads, that unless he originated the idea, or unless the people he hired to do these various tasks told him this was the way it should be, it wasn't a good way. But, as I say, I think it's early times for me to be evaluating Paijmans, although I served under him for quite a while. When I was made a Director of a department, and [Reginald A.] Clarke was made a Director of a department, I hired Algic [D. A.] de Silva to be my deputy, and Reg Clarke hired Martijn Paijmans to be his deputy. Suddenly not many years later the two of us were reporting to Martijn Paijmans as a Vice President. That was hard to adjust to, but, anyway, I think I'll skip any more about Paijmans.

MUIR: You made a reference to Presidents Woods and McNamara. Do you have any other thoughts on their impact or relationships with ADM?

TWINING: Well, I don't think Woods had a great impact on ADM, although we dealt with him very much. Woods had a tendency to be both friendly and helpful, but also antagonistic. I remember well that we'd go to a Board meeting. I would go with Mike Lejeune. I was Deputy Director and Mike was Director. I would have agreed with Lejeune on a position, and Woods would have agreed that it was the right position, and the paper would be written accordingly. Mike would read from or quote from

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the paper in the Board meeting, and say we propose to do the following, and give all the reasons. If no Board member raised his hand and began to argue with us, Woods would. Not only would he do that to get us in a defensive mood, but then he'd try to get me to say that I didn't agree with what Mike said. This was a technique. He didn't mean to undercut us, or make us look silly. But it was a technique he used, I think, to show the Board that he as the President, was right on top of this situation and he suspected that there were some things that maybe we weren't telling the Board, and by God he was going to find them out. And he was going to find them out right there at the table and the Board could chime in and, of course, the Board did. First thing you know, the Board members would say, "That's sort of crazy. Why are you going to go that way? What are you going to do this for?" Then Woods finally would back off and say, "No, no, no, that's fine. I think they're just right." But, in the meantime, we're both sitting there with egg all over our faces, and Woods was enjoying it. It took a while to get used to this form of leadership. I think both Mike and I had times when we thought this man was really sticking the shiv in and turning it, and we were squirming.

McNamara, on the other hand, was, as you probably know, very incisive. He knew more about what was in a paper you'd put up to him, at the time you went up to defend it, than you knew about it. He was a voracious reader, and he always got to the bottom line very quickly, and he would tell you, in no uncertain terms. McNamara used an entirely different philosophy. We went to the Board occasionally, several times, on this GW [George Washington University] property. It was a complicated arrangement. The University was going to sell us the land and then we were going to build a building and they were going to buy the land back in 40 years, and they were going to get the building at a fixed price in today's dollars. On the face of it, unless you go through the exercise of present values, which we did to come up with this proposal, it looks a little stupid. You're going to, quote, "give away" a building which is only 40 years old, and has certainly not outlived its usefulness, for the same price as back in the late seventies or eighties when we finished building it. By that time that building is going to be worth, on paper anyway, maybe five times what it's worth when first completed.

Once McNamara had been convinced, or maybe even contributed to deciding how to go, then he backed you up all the way. There was none of this games playing like Woods did at the Board. McNamara would not only be very supportive, but if he sensed that a Director was trying to make

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a staff member squirm--whether it was administration or an operational staff member on a proposed loan--McNamara would answer the question himself. He wouldn't make the staff member either reveal his ignorance or stumble around trying to get the right answer. In that way he was very supportive. Once you'd convinced him that that was the way to go, he was going to get it through the Board, come hell or high water. And he did. He put down a lot of Executive Directors who had very legitimate concerns about what we were doing.

The same thing was true earlier when we were going to buy the Fund building. We had to negotiate with the Fund, and it was a difficult negotiation because the Fund had a view of a castle that they were abandoning, and they knew how much their new building was going to cost. McNamara had certain views about that building. I think in your notes you refer to his concerns. But all these things, when they got to the Board under McNamara, were very well handled indeed. He would not embarrass you in front of the Board, nor would he knife you in the back.

MUIR: But was he easy to convince in the first place?

TWINING: No. You had to have a lot of facts. Somebody once said that McNamara had a computer for a mind, and he kept saying he didn't like computers. He'd rather do it on the back of an envelope, and he'd do it fast. I enjoyed watching Mr. McNamara at work--although it was a time of some concern that we were going to be made to look foolish, or that he was not going to agree with us in the end--more than I enjoyed watching others above me work.

MUIR: Were we generally successful in getting our point across to McNamara, and getting his support?

TWINING: Yes, I think so, at least on the Administrative Services side we were. Personnel had a slightly more difficult problem, partly because McNamara felt a little more uncomfortable with the Board about personnel matters, where a lot of money was at stake. Every two percent increase represents a huge sum of money to the staff and working hours, and vacation time, and pensions. These are big numbers. It's a lot of money to run the Administration Department too, but relatively speaking it's less because you're dealing with one particular project which is going to cost X and is not going to escalate year after year after year. In Personnel if you give a four percent increase today and you keep on going like that you're going to have a payroll of significant size in five years time. So I

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think he was less sure of himself there, although he had very definite views as to what was right and what was wrong. He also had, I think, in the very beginning some antagonistic feeling about the Staff Association, which increased in size and influence during his career. In the end, he supported everything that was finally agreed, but in the beginning he would have preferred that the Staff Association hadn't existed.

MUIR: Because he was very interested in the dollar bottom line, did this affect allocation of resources to ADM severely?

TWINING: Not really. I'm sure we didn't get the same percentage of the budget, in terms of the number of people we had in the department or in terms of the number of projects we were operating, as other non-operational departments got. I think we did better than the Secretary's Department and better than the Information and Public Affairs Department. Personnel probably got a better shake from McNamara, in terms of the money that was allocated, than we did. However, there was no project that we proposed to do, or any continuing work that we had to do--in the maintenance of buildings, or the building of new buildings, or the communications operation, or records, or language services, or anything else--that he picked out and said, "No you can't have that much money for that operation." He gave us less money as a department than maybe we asked for, and left it to us to allocate it however we wanted. By us, I mean either Chadenet or, later, Pajmans. That was only his view of which departmental function was more important. If you had a pie that was so big you divided it up and tried to give it to those who needed it most in your judgement. But I never felt that we were squeezed to the point where we couldn't do basically what we had set out to do.

MUIR: What do you see as some of the highlights in the evolution of ADM during your period as Director?

TWINING: Well, I don't know if highlights is the right word. If by highlights you mean major events that occurred during my directorship, I can identify them. I was promoted to Department Director in September 1971. That December I was sitting at my desk just toward the end of the year and I began jotting down the things that I thought the Administrative Services Department had to do in the following year. I think I headed it Problems as 1972 Dawns, or something. These were things that were on my mind, and I'd go home and I couldn't go to sleep some nights because of them. And I kept that up. I kept it just underneath my blotter in my office. So I have a series of these things going back

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to 1971 and finishing in 1983. There were two things that started in 1971 and, when I looked the other day, were still there in 1982. One was space and the other was travel. Those were the two things that I think our department was responsible for that gave us, as a department, the most trouble for more than a decade. So I think those are two major events.

First, the difficulty in making a decision about when we had to rent more space, how many people we had to move into that space, why we took space here and not there, and what kind of a deal we could make on the space. When we decided to go after the GW property, we went through difficult negotiations for it, and delays occurred because we had to go through five or six different commissions in the District to get approval. Then there was the Don't Tear It Down group, and the Neighborhood Advisory Committee, all these people who fought us from the very beginning, and who didn't want a building where this one stands on the George Washington GW University campus. That made us then decide to buy the property where the I building is, because we could build a building there quickly, while we were still negotiating for the GW property on 19th Street. All of those things were, as I say, with us in 1971 and they're still with us. Now they're busy building another building for 1985 or 1986 or whenever it'll be finished. And I'm sure that won't end it. I guess Bill [William J.] Cosgrove, if he keeps such a list, will keep it on his list too.

The other is the blessed travel policy. The history of that I won't try to go through, but, as you know, in the very beginning we had American Express, and then Woods came along and he said get rid of American Express: "All they do is make a commission on every flight we take. We'll run it ourselves". We got to the point where we thought American Express was not giving us the best service, and we thought that, although they weren't getting anything from us, they were getting a big slug from the airlines. So the contract expired with American Express, over their screams and squeals, and they left and we undertook to hire people to run our own Travel Office. That was fine during Woods' period, when the Bank had about 1,200 staff members. We went from 556 to about 1,263. So when Woods was here we were fairly stable at around twelve hundred, I believe. We were running the Travel Office ourselves, doing all of the bookings and making all of the reservations and deciding what staff could and couldn't do in making their travel arrangements. In those days first class was pretty prevalent, until Woods decided we couldn't afford that anymore because of the image impact on IDA replenishment and a few other things. It was a very traumatic experience and it probably wasn't the right decision. In any case, as you also know, we eventually went back to American Express and the travel policy was amended to permit some first class travel on long distance flights.

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However, we always thought American Express ought to be able to do better, and I gather they're still negotiating a contract. They put it out for bid I believe, but settled again on American Express. I'm not sure of the bidding. They're still trying to get American Express to computerize the whole operation. American Express has done more than we expected them to be able to do, I guess. But that was number two. I think travel probably ran second to space as being the biggest headache, or major event, in my tenure as Director.

There were others, but these were almost at the top of the list every year. But some would come on and then they'd drop off and then they'd reappear again. The whole document control problem must have started in 1973. It was a question of how to get a handle on controlling the documents in the World Bank, and a study of this was undertaken. We called in an outside firm, and that stayed on my list for quite a while, so I would guess that could be considered as one of the important major events. I think we've got a handle on it now. Anyway, it's firmly in place. Whether it's the best that it could be is another question.

Another one that had been a constant bother was food services. There was the issue of whether Marriott should run our food services or whether we should put that out to bid, which we eventually did just before I retired. Then they decided after I had left that they were going to keep Marriott on. But the quality of food services, the subsidy of food services, the length of the lines in the cafeteria, the cleanliness of the cafeteria, and why people got fed so well in the dining room, were issues that constantly kept coming to the surface. With the Staff Association these problems were magnified. You got to the point where you began to think that what we ought to do is put out a notice saying anybody who doesn't like the Bank's food service is jolly well invited to go outside. There are restaurants all over the place. "Oh, no," was the reply. "It's the quality of life. You have to provide these services. You don't want us spending our time going to restaurants."

Another recurring problem was security. When I joined the Bank anybody could walk in off the street. You didn't have to show anything. You might or might not work in the Bank, but you could come right in the building. Then, as the tightening up process began, all you had to do was wave a pass and the guard would look at it. It could be the Safeway shopping card, or it could be your American Express card, anything, and he'd wave you in. Then, of course, we got to the point where we narrowed

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the opening where the guard could actually see the card. Now I guess they're still considering the possibility of turnstiles or some other method of controlling access. As we told you this morning, I drove in the garage, the man handed me the slip that Charles [Ziegler] had called about, and to an extent I suppose that was security. But I could have been carrying a bomb in my car, and I could have been coming in with someone other than Hector Prud'homme, who wanted to take out a typewriter if we got near one. So I guess you have to put security down as another major event during my tenure. It went from practically zero to what we have today. And it's probably going to go further.

The other major event I guess would have to be printing, because that is something that has escalated to the point where you can't walk in a corridor anymore without stumbling over what the Print Shop has produced. Every couple years we put in a new and bigger printing press. We managed to keep the staff at a constant level. We didn't increase the staff, but every time we turned around we had to spend another fifty to one hundred thousand dollars for a new machine, and the new machine was to avoid having to hire two more people. Then we decided we should move the whole printing operation out to Springfield, Virginia. Great cries of anguish went up. All those who lived in Maryland said they would never get to work, and those who lived in Virginia were delighted. It went on and on for a long time. I don't know the latest, but now they've dropped that idea. Now the exercise is let's see how much we can farm out. Reagan philosophy: take it away from government and give it back to private industry. Take it away from the Bank's doing it, set a dollar amount and contract it out. We'll see what comes of that. I think that probably has to be on the list as another major event.

Then there are two more. One I would say is word processing. We started word processing in my department at the time it was first introduced. We had the MT/ST. I think we were the first ones in Washington to have an MT/ST operation of the size we had, and it was a wonderful achievement. All the loan officers and the people in operations were delighted that they could send this stuff down and get it back the next morning. This was long before computerized reproduction, but it was a start. Eventually, we surrendered word processing to OPD [Organization Planning Department], and probably correctly so.

Finally, there was the whole concept of service standards, some of which you are probably suffering with now. We decided that the staff had an increasing demand level. If you gave them something overnight they wanted it in six hours instead of twelve hours. If you gave them five copies

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they wanted ten. That applies to all of the services we provide, whether it's cleaning the floors or providing documents. We began to work out a system--I guess Bill [Cosgrove] is still trying--of service standards and some controls so that, not only will the staff know what to expect, but the budget people will know what they're going to have to pay if the Administrative Services Department is going to provide service at a certain standard. So, I would guess you could add that as a major event.

MUIR: Would you say, therefore, that those were the items you most frequently had on your agenda for your meetings with your superiors?

TWINING: Almost always, yes. They were certainly the items that were on the list in the beginning of the year. In many cases during the course of the year they'd drop off because we dealt with them. We'd decide, okay, Marriott's going to stay, and we're going to give them this much more leeway in how they provide the food, or what food, or the size of the portions, or whatever. We'd reach an accommodation. Then the next year it would be back on again because, in the meantime, some other change had occurred. We'd opened a new dining room, or we'd opened a new cafeteria, and there were squeals from the staff because it was overcrowded. I remember when the I building was opened, and we put the cafeteria on the first floor overlooking I Street. It was supposed to be the latest in--I don't know what they called it--the split line. You could go here and get a sandwich, and you went there if you wanted to get the full meal. Well, then people would go one place and they decided they didn't like the looks of the sandwiches, so they wanted to cut into the other line. In the meantime, that line went out to the elevators. You think you have the thing under control, and you take it off your list and the next thing you know it's right back on again because of a new development that you really hadn't foreseen.

MUIR: Were you in the unfortunate position of having to deal with all these details, because frequently the complaints were at your level?

TWINING: Well, more often than not, they were on my list because I knew that these were divisional problems that were being dealt with and I was going to have to eventually make some kind of a decision. Some were pressures from above being put on my shoulders, and I knew I'd have to pass them down. But most of them were there, and had been there, as I say, since 1971. They're just part of the game for Administrative Services administrators. You expect them. But that's not listing all of the things that flow gently along with very little crisis.

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Building maintenance was always a big problem. No matter which Vice President we worked under, we'd get a call or a snowflake [a numbered note from Martijn Paijmans, Vice President for Personnel and Administration] or something saying there were five cigarettes on the floor of the balcony in the A building, and "why didn't we keep this place clean?" I don't consider that a major event. But those things also had to be dealt with. Creation of the Records Center Annex at National Underground Storage, deciding to put our documents in Pennsylvania, was an important decision, but it's worked very well. It hasn't been a problem. It's not a major event in the sense that major events are problems. That's the only distinction I'm making.

MUIR: What were some of the major organizational changes and departmental spin-offs during this period, and could you describe the effects of the 1972 reorganization on ADM?

TWINING: That reorganization was studied at a time when Mr. Shoaib was Vice President and had been delegated by Mr. McNamara to look at the organization of the Bank. I'm sure Mr. McNamara had given Mr. Shoaib some suggestions of his own as to how he thought the Bank ought to be organized. Shoaib approached this by having a committee formed, of which I was a member. Then we engaged the firm of McKinsey & Company to make the study, or to be the leaders in studying the present organization and making changes. So I was involved, as a member, in each of the decisions that had to come to the committee, generally from the consultants. Then papers were prepared which were floated around the Bank to the various departments that were affected and eventually, I'm sure, Mr. Shoaib discussed them informally with Mr. McNamara before they were formalized into a recommendation.

As far as Admin. is concerned, undoubtedly the major effect was in space planning. It was a very difficult time for us in the sense that, if you were going to merge or consolidate units into a regional structure --which is basically what the reorganization of 1972 did--it was clear that you had to have these units located either adjacent to one another, or close enough so that you weren't making it difficult for the organization to work. That required us to look very carefully not only at what our space situation was at the time it happened, but what it should be quite a way down the road, because we weren't sure--I wasn't anyway--of what the growth pattern would be in the new organization. It's one thing to say you're going to have four regions instead of two, or you're going to have four regions instead of a functional office, department, bureau, whatever. It's another to say that if you continued in the functional mode the growth would be X, but if you split into a regional mode the growth would

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be Y because you lost the advantages of numbers. You had to have a little bit of each in all the regions instead of a whole lot of one in one department. So, because of that, the question of space became much more complicated for us than it might have been. We thought we would be able to provide enough adjacent space to fulfill the obvious requirements of the reorganization. What we didn't know was how much spare space we had to provide, and should provide at the time you made the move, and what that would mean to our total space allocation. I think probably we made some miscalculations. We ended up giving too little space to the Asia region and too much space to the Middle East, or whatever. Perhaps this division which previously didn't exist, or this department that previously didn't exist wasn't in the right place vis-a-vis another department that didn't exist. That's the major thing. Also, there was an increase in demand for services that came out of this reorganization. Again, the loss of the advantages of size made for increased demands throughout the organization. You'd think that if you had a pie and you broke it up into five parts, the sum of the parts would still equal the whole, but it's not true. If you break it up into five parts, the demands on our services for each of the five are greater than the demands used to be for the whole.

The other thing that affected us was the increase in field missions. I don't mean missions to the field to make a loan, but creation of resident missions. That had an effect on documents, on procurement, and on travel.

Finally, I guess the other major effect was on document control, on how you had to reclassify, or redesign all the documents that previously had been in Technical Operations and Lending. Suddenly it wasn't Technical Operations and Lending anymore. It was region X and region Y and a little bit of this, and a little bit of that. And the Education Division was all dispersed into the regions, and the engineers were all dispersed in the regions, and the documents that you knew they were going to need weren't in that fashion. You had to redesign the whole thing. So I think those were the four major effects on Admin. of the reorganization of 1972.

MUIR: And spin-offs, were they purely a function of the increase in size of the Bank and the Department?

TWINING: Yes, I think they were. There were a number of organizational changes which are best described in Bogomir Chokel's [Archivist of the World Bank] organization chart of the Bank. In fact, I'm sure Bogomir researched this very carefully, and this is the way it looked in 1977. But I remember that in the Administration Department of Bill Howell's day, Francis Poore had the title of Deputy Director and Controller, or Assistant Director--I forget. So the Controller function was in the Administration Department at one time, and this chart doesn't reflect that. This chart shows the Controller flowing from the Treasurer's Department. There may have been some people in the Treasurer's Department who were performing a controllership function, but the Controller was Francis R. Poore, and he was deputy to Howell and in Administration. We also had, at that time, a fellow called [Arnold] Johnston, who was hired to be the budget officer. I'm sorry. We had a fellow before that by the name of Arnold Kirch, who was the budget officer, and he was in Administration. So if you go that far back, they were not department head level so that's why they're not on Bogomir's chart. But, in fact, from the old Administration Department of 1947, in addition to everything you see here, there was Program Evaluation and Control, or Budget, and there was the Controller function, in addition to Admin. Services, Personnel, Organization and Planning. I guess that's it.

The spin-offs as a result of the reorganization of 1972 were minimal, as far as we were concerned. There were none. I think it might have been a bad time. I believe McNamara decreed that the Administration Department would be divided into two departments: Admin. Services and Personnel. Then the reorganization of 1972 added Organization and Planning, because when we first started as Admin. Services we had Bill [William D.S.] Fraser as organization planning officer, so we kept Organization Planning and then, when the reorganization of 1972 came about, they moved Organization and Planning to a separate department and three of us reported to Shoaib for a short time and then to Chadenet. I think that the only spin-off of the 1972 reorganization that affected Admin. Services directly was the creation of Organization and Planning as a separate function.

MUIR: Could you discuss the Bank's administrative philosophy towards such things as staff benefits, travel policy and salary?

TWINING: I wasn't sure that I could answer that question. That was one of the questions I had most trouble with when I was reading it.

MUIR: Was there a clear position?

TWINING: I'm not quite sure I know what you mean by administrative philosophy. Does this mean how these policies affect Admin., or does it mean was Admin. involved in shaping these policies, and if so, how? And then, what was the philosophy behind what we did to do that? The question of philosophy in connection with the various services, I believe, is what you're asking.

I guess there is one underlying philosophy, and it went from the top to the level of decision making or to the level of recommendation. That had to be the budget. I think there was probably no Administrative Services decision--and I would include Personnel as well--that hadn't a serious and significant effect on the Bank's budget. This had to be in the minds of either the people down below who were proposing changes, or the people at the top who were directing changes, or somewhere in between in the evolution of a policy. Obviously, the needs of the staff very often gave rise to the original recommendations made to management. You find that the staff believes that there is a need for a day care center. Now, that idea could have come from someone in the Administration Department or in the Personnel Management Department or from the Staff Association. But, as it works its way up to the top for a decision, the philosophy that I think has to be associated with the decision making process is whether it's cost effective. There are certain things which are on the margin. They might never have been able to prove that it was cost effective, but it was such a socially attractive thing to do, or it was felt to be so needed by the staff, that you waived the issue of cost effectiveness.

In addition to cost effectiveness as a criterion or a philosophy, you also had with many of the Administrative Services decisions, at least at the time they were taken at the top level, a political philosophy to concern yourself with. The whole decision as to whether the Bank would participate with the Fund in the creation of the Bretton Woods Recreation Center was an example of this. Mr. Woods thought this was a good idea, and I'm sure the staff of the Bank thought it was a good idea. It got to within an eyelash of being approved, until someone--and I don't know who it was--reminded Mr. Woods that if we were seen to be putting Bank money into a recreation center, or what was commonly called a country club, the votes for IDA, which were already very scarce, would drop off, and it would be twice as hard to get IDA funds. So the whole philosophy, which was "this is good for the quality of life of the staff members," was washed away because of a political issue.

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I think the same thing is happening now with food services. I'm not sure whether this is political. I rather doubt it because it's been so long that we have had what was always considered to be a very plush food service program, looked at from the outside. In fact, it was so plush that at one time we had to have people show their cards at the cafeteria because we were feeding half of G Street, coming across from the Federal Government. The reason was because it was subsidized. But, these issues, as they become policy, are affected by a great number of philosophies. I would think the single philosophy that affected most policies was probably the budgetary philosophy: that we shouldn't live beyond our means and that we should not provide things which we couldn't comfortably accommodate in the budget, given that we had so much to give to ourselves and so much to give to our member countries in terms of our operations.

It's ironic that in connection with the Bretton Woods Recreation Center, despite the decision that the Bank would not be involved, it was always referred to as "the Bank's country club." On the Hill a speech by Senator Long of Maryland would be against IDA replenishment in part because those people are living too well. "They've got a big country club out there; it's tax-free. Why should we be giving them money when they spend it that way?" So, I think Mr. Woods was correct in his decision that we couldn't afford to be involved in it, but it was too late. Just by virtue of the fact that Bank staff members can participate in it became a reason to have wished we hadn't been involved with it. I don't think I know of any other, John, that would help to describe the philosophy that affected us. Most of it had to do, as I say, with a prudent budget policy, and a forced-upon-us political philosophy.

MUIR: You've made several references to the Staff Association today. Could you briefly characterize ADM's relationship with the Staff Association during your directorship?

TWINING: Well, I think during the early years of Admin. Services, about 1971 to 1975, the Staff Association--I'm not sure that I know the date on which it was formally created, but in the early seventies--was finding its way. It wasn't sure how far it could go to influence Bank management or departmental management in pressing demands or grievances of the staff. From the management's point of view, an active union, which is basically what it is, was foreign. We had never had one.

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The Fund, on the other hand, did have one from the very beginning. I don't know how successful the Fund's union was. I don't think it was very successful. In fact, it became moribund for a while, I think. It was inactive and suddenly when the concept of a Staff Association began in the Bank it revived the Fund union and both of us had Staff Associations.

As far as the mechanics and the procedures we followed with the Staff Association in Admin. Services were concerned, we had, of course, many lengthy discussions with members of the Association, either the senior officers of the Association or subcommittees that they created to deal with different subjects. Many of these, in the early days, were chaired by Chadenet as Vice President. He would have the appropriate Director or assistant director or division chief come to participate in the meeting, whether it was from the Personnel side or the Admin. Services side. These were largely ad hoc meetings which were requested by the Chairman of the Staff Association. It continued that way, as I remember, for maybe a couple of years, with the initiative left to the Staff Association to raise issues that they thought were worthy of discussion. I think there were many in the Bank on management side at that time who thought it was going to go away. It was a new initiative but it was not going to last. How could things be better than they were in the World Bank? It probably wasn't until the Association had been in existence for maybe two or two-and-a-half years that it was clear to management at the highest level and all the way down that it was here to stay.

Then we began to formalize it. In my department we had an agreement to meet--I think it was monthly--with the Chairman of the Association, and whomever he wanted to bring with him. Of course, we'd meet ad hoc whenever they had an issue that they thought was worth considering at the time. The monthly meetings were attended by myself and other members of the front office, with the officers of the Association. We tried to have an agenda for each meeting. At least it was an agenda that referred to the general topic, not a specific issue; we were going to talk about travel, or space planning, or food services, or quality of life--that type of thing. Then, out of those general discussion meetings would come specific suggestions.

In those earlier days, and I would suggest it's still true today, most of the real burning issues as far as the Staff Association was concerned were directed at PMD, and not Admin. Services. We had more tangential issues: is the food hot enough, is the line too long, and can't you do something about getting

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the building cooler in the summer and warmer in the winter. These were the types of issues which, while they were of interest to a large number of staff members, they could sleep at night whether they got an answer, yes or no. But the burning issues were things like pay and salary, job classification and travel policy. Travel policy got to be so burning an issue that the staff threatened to strike. I remember Mr. Woods called a meeting of the entire staff in the Eugene Black Auditorium one day to tell them why we were changing our travel policy, and what his philosophy was about staff travel. Again, this had a political origin. We were being criticized heavily by the U.S. Congress because so many Bank staff members were getting off the front--first class--end of the airplane. Even Congressmen weren't always getting off the front end of the airplane. Many of the Bank staff were being met by limousines, carted off to their appointed tasks in the member countries, and this was evidence of a lifestyle that was much too glamorous for the Congress to agree to vote funds for IDA, quote, "giveaway" funds. This got to be a very burning issue. I'm not sure it's put to bed yet. I expect there are still people who don't like the travel policy. The airlines cooperated nicely by creating more classes. At that time, when Mr. Woods had to make his plea to the staff to sit tight, it was a question of first class versus less-than-first-class, and we were taking away first class travel privileges. When I traveled for the Bank all during my years in Personnel, and when I was doing recruiting, I always went first class to London, to Paris, wherever. In fact, in the first missions that I went on I got a berth. I was in one of those big-bellied Pan Am planes and they put four berths down at the bar level, and I went to sleep if I could. But that was the issue. It was a first class versus less-than-first-class issue. I don't have to go over all of the ramifications of that and how we dealt with it over the course of time. There were various ways of dealing with that issue. As I say, the airlines helped us by creating business class suddenly, and that was closer to first class than steerage.

I think over the course of my career in Admin. Services relations with the Staff Association were good. But the Staff Association was rather impatient, in the early days, to show the staff that they were worth their salt. They were going to get changes made, and our organizational structure was not geared to making changes as quickly as the Staff Association thought we should be making them. So there was a bit of antagonism there that maybe still exists today. I don't know. But, on the whole, the issues that came up to me while I was Director were not issues that were too difficult. Largely,

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they had to do with food service, with travel which was the biggest, and with space. "Don't make me move again; why do I have to move; every time I get myself situated in a nice building and I know my neighbors and I know my way then you move us. You're moving us to L Street--my God we'll never get there!" That sort of thing.

MUIR: Was there a political issue here in terms of the number of concessions made to Staff Association?

TWINING: No, not that I know of. No, that never came up in my time. Now, that may have been the case in relations with other departments, but we never decided that there would be a quota. This month we'd say yes, and that would give us two months of no.

MUIR: Did you ever have any problems with pressure from above in terms of selecting candidates for jobs, such as an Executive Director wanting a relative on board, with ADM being the most likely spot?

TWINING: This question probably should be addressed to PMD, at least in the current context of Bank affairs. In the early years, when I was in Personnel, we had a certain amount of this. Very seldom were we pressured in any way to take someone for a professional or a policy-making, or whatever you want to call it, job. We did have some suggestions made to us by senior Board members as to people who could serve on the messenger staff or in the Print Shop or in Office Services. More often than not they were people who were, maybe not related to the officer in question, but of his same nationality and deserving of any possible help the Bank could give, and often with a tale of woe at home where this person had been very badly treated or out of luck or something. But not much. I think that it could have been very much greater than it was. It really wasn't an issue. It was frowned upon, obviously. We were going out of our way to be as objective as we could be about hiring for the staff. We've already discussed the U.S. problem and the number of people available from Europe. So, I never knew of anybody that was put in any kind of a senior position by virtue of pressure of that kind. It was always at a very low level, if it existed at all, and not very often.

MUIR: Could you discuss the origins of the ADM strengthening exercise?

TWINING: I think I should leave this questions to others as well, John. At the time we started the strengthening exercise Bill Cosgrove had been invited to go to Harvard to undertake this course, together with Jack Mossop of the Personnel Management Department, and out of it came the strengthening exercise. When Bill went, and when he asked me for permission to go, he didn't know precisely what would come of it. All he knew was that it was a program designed to get people to consider a new way of what used to be called, or maybe still is, the "quality circle" concept, which up until that time had been largely in industry. I guess it originated in Japan, where they got all the workers and sat them around a table at five o'clock in the afternoon and went over the day's activities and the members of the "circle" made recommendations as to how they could have been improved. By virtue of this you were supposed to get better quality, a happier work force and more production.

When Bill came back he gave us a report of what had transpired and said that he would like to try and use it at the Bank. In fact, they had used the Administrative Services Department operations as their project presented for this course at Harvard, and they were encouraged by the comments of the people who were running the course that this was a good concept for use in ASD and that it should be followed up. As a device for getting staff at all levels involved in management decisions, or at least in considering the issues that are involved in running an organization, it's a very useful thing. Whether it's a success or a failure, I think probably it's too early to tell. It took, as you well know, a great deal of staff time. I have no reason to think it hasn't been a success, but there are issues that were discussed in these task forces which lent themselves to group decision, or group recommendation, and others that didn't. How many decisions are going to flow from the involvement of the staff in this sort of thing, and how much time they spend on it, I think is too early to tell. So, I think maybe another five years from now you'll be talking to someone who is here today, and was here when we started the strengthening exercise and who will have been there when it was fully implemented, and he'll be able to tell you whether or not it was successful. I think we already know that some of the proposals have been dropped, and that some of the proposals were considered very useful and are well on the way to implementation. But I think it's really too early to tell how good it was, whether we were right or wrong to spend that amount of time in doing it.

MUIR: Moving on, would you please discuss the evolution of the Bank's physical plant.

TWINING: Well, that's a lengthy subject. Many hours are spent by staff of Admin. Services and on up the ladder, including up to the President, on space planning. The major issue in space planning has always been, and probably still is and will always be, whether to plan for the long-term future or the short-term future. By long-term, I don't mean next month or next year. I mean a decade away or five years away. I suppose if we had made what we thought were long-term space decisions in 1950 or 1951 we would have found ourselves in just as much trouble as we were ten years later, because we would have decided the Bank was going to grow at two percent, four percent, or whatever, and we would have built a building to accommodate the size of staff we thought we needed to deal with that kind of growth. In fact, as you know, one of the options we had was to buy land on which the Watergate apartments are now situated. I'm sure, had we bought the land then, and built a building, knowing what we thought was going to be the size of the staff, it would have been too small, we would have outgrown it, and we would have been completely boxed in. We would have had the river on one side of us and Virginia Avenue on the other and that's as far as we could have gotten. We would then have either had to have people commuting from various parts of D.C., or we would have had to pick up and move away entirely. So, the issue is: are your growth plans sufficiently clear that you can act on them and build buildings that will accommodate you for that many years in the future? I suspect you can't.

But there are certain watershed decisions that we made on space planning. The first, I suppose, came when it was decided we should part company with the Fund and not live together in the same building. That led to the Fund buying the old fire house and the land where the F building is now located, and it resulted in the Bank buying the Hurley Wright Building on the corner of 18th and H and that little Columbia Lighthouse for the Blind building that was sitting between them, and then going around and encompassing the entire block. I think at the time we were doing this nobody thought we'd need any more than this block, assuming we got the whole thing, which we eventually did. That probably was the first decision that we made, and whether it was a right one or not, who knows? Probably we'd have been better off then to have gone to Montgomery County or Fairfax County, bought sufficient acreage to expand indefinitely, and built a building that was needed for the size of the Bank at that time. Hindsight being so much better than foresight, that would have made a lot of sense then.

There has always been a problem with space planning when you talk of long-term future and going outside the District, and that is the Board of Directors. The Board, as you know, consists of people who are generally serving dual roles. They're either financial counselors or other officials at their

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embassies. They come to the Bank, and they have an office at the Bank, but they also have an office in the embassy, and they don't want to have to spend an hour going to the headquarters of the Bank located in the suburbs to have a meeting or to sit in a Board meeting. So any decision we took to take us out of the District of Columbia any distance would have been objected to, I'm sure, by the influential Board members. The U.S. has always, I think, preferred that we be within spitting distance of the Treasury. So all of those things militated against doing a lot of long range space planning. I know Bill Cosgrove is now doing some more. I don't know what will come of it, but the question continues: is this the right thing to do, to pick up a building here and a lot there, to rent everything we have to in the interim? And it's a subject which I'm not sure is one that can ever get the "right" decision.

MUIR: Were there serious proposals at any stage, that reached a high level, to move?

TWINING: Oh, yes. The first one was the Watergate space. That was decided negatively because at that time the Korean War was on and, again, it was a political issue: would it look right for the Bank to be buying steel to build a big new building at a time when all the resources in the U.S. that could go to the Korean War should go to it? Then the next decision was should we encompass this whole block? Should we buy the White Tower, which we never could do, and the building next to it, and the Fund buy that apartment building? That was answered affirmatively. We should and we would probably always be able to use that block, and it would probably serve us for years and years to come.

Then, of course, the next watershed decision was whether we should further separate from the Fund, and if they built across the street would we buy their buildings from them? That was answered affirmatively. We decided we would, and we did. But each of these decisions was made more or less out of necessity. There was never, I think, a real long-term plan for housing the Bank, or of ideal space for the Bank. It was always two or three years down the road, and I guess in hindsight it's just as well that that was the case because, unless we had picked up and moved out and bought lots of land, we would never have gotten a big enough building. No matter where in the District we'd gone, I think we'd never have anticipated the growth that took place in the 1970s. As far as I can see it's still taking place.

MUIR: You referred to the negotiations with the Fund on the E and F buildings. Do you have any additional information that might be interesting, particularly regarding Mr. McNamara's involvement?

TWINING: The negotiations with the Fund were not at all volatile. It had been agreed that the Bank would buy the buildings. The Fund, I believe, by that time had already bought, or at least was on the verge of buying, and had a commitment to buy, the space across the street. So, it was really not a question of yes, up or down. It was a question of how much. The only recollection I have of Mr. McNamara's involvement, apart from the final decision as to the number, was whether we would be tricked into paying too much for what he considered to be a rather elaborate and overly done twelfth floor executive suite. As a matter of fact, he was opposed to paying very much for that. He called it a waste of space. But later on he began to use it more and more and he used to have farewell ceremonies for retiring staff and to welcome new staff there. The administration of the Fund and of the Bank couldn't agree initially on the price. So we decided the best way to go was to each hire an appraiser and let the appraisers sit and knock each other's heads until they got a figure which they were satisfied, between them, was the right figure, based on Washington real estate values. And we did that. We didn't fight over the decision. We thought our appraiser had succeeded in getting the right price, and I'm sure that the Fund thought that their appraiser had not buckled under and they were getting a price they could live with. I don't know who was right, but we abided by the combined appraisal. It was a single figure and the purchase was made.

MUIR: The fact that we've never been able to plan far ahead and purchase surplus space has meant there's been a lot of internal moves within the Bank. Has the frequency of moves caused you problems?

TWINING: Oh, yes, of course. I think we covered a lot of this question before. It's caused problems and will continue to cause problems in the future. I think part of that question was why we did not let people go a distance away and let the telephone substitute for walking a block. Of course, the answer is that no matter how easy it is to prove that, with the use of computers or telephones or whatever, the units that work together don't need to be adjacent to each other, it never succeeds in convincing anybody who is going to be affected by the move. In the first place, there is a considerable mystique about being close to the President, and an awful lot of Department Directors in the early days, and now Vice Presidents, are very reluctant to have their units moved far from where the President's seat is, despite the fact that he may never call them, and may seldom see them. It is always pointed out to us, whenever we start talking about you moving here, you moving there, the large number of meetings that are held in the Bank. The Bank is an unusual institution in that everything is done in a collegial meeting, and it's very expensive to have to call people from two or three blocks away to have a meeting.

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Then we say, "Yes, but someday you'll be able to pick up your telephone and you'll have everybody's image. It will be as if you were sitting around a single table, and you'll just have to be looking at a screen and there's everybody you want to talk to." They would usually respond by saying, "Well, when that day comes maybe we'll think differently, but right now we can't move." Then the final argument we always get, and continue to get I suppose, is that they can't be away from the service facilities. "Do you want my people to have to spend a half-hour walking down to go to the cafeteria or the Credit Union or the bank, and a half-hour walking back, and lose an hour's productivity a day because we're not in a building close enough to make it handy to do that? If you move us, you're going to have to put in a cafeteria, you're going to have to put in a branch of AS & T [American Security and Trust]." Those are the issues.

The solution to that problem, as well as the problems we are talking about before, is to move out to Shady Grove, or wherever, and buy enough land that you could continue to erect buildings attached in some fashion to the next one, and have your headquarters there. I don't think that day will ever come for the World Bank, but, who knows, it may. Even when we build a new building, as in my time--I was here but not involved with the building of C, I was here and involved in the building of D, in the purchase of E, the purchase of F, the building of I and the building of H, and the start of J, but not the finish--that's not going to solve anything. I suspect that when J is finished, we will still need to keep everybody that's in the N building, which is rented, and which we tried our best to buy but we never could. So, I don't see a solution to the space problem other than the solution we've got, which is to keep constructing or renting buildings until there is no more space to buy or rent in the neighborhood. Then we're going to have to face up to doing it another way.

MUIR: ADM space proposals are often appealed to the Vice President or President. Is this a procedure that works fairly well, because it gets support from the highest levels for our plans?

TWINING: If you mean does it work very well from the point of view of those who are making the proposals in the first place against those who are appealing them because they don't like the proposals, I suppose it works well because it puts the final cap on. It makes the final decision. Mr. So-and-so, who's the Vice President for such-and-such, is going to move, and the President says so. That's it.

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We may have fought with him for six months before, explaining where he was going to move, and why he was going to move, and how his move would be handled, but it wasn't until he had his final day in court that he accepted it. To that extent, it's a system that works. Obviously, from Admin. Services point of view, it would be much cleaner and neater, and I suppose more economical, if they'd take our decision in the first place and not appeal it. Appeals take time. And we don't always win. We moved the Legal Department across the street one year, with the President's approval, I remember, and the howls that went up from the Legal Department were such that, well, they stayed there, but they stayed there kicking and screaming and eventually they got a commitment out of the President that the next building that was built would see them in it, or at least back in the headquarters building, which happened. They came back to the E building. That, too, is a problem that is never going to go away until you move away from the crowded D.C. area.

MUIR: What role did you play in the growth and development of the Bank's field offices and resident missions throughout the world?

TWINING: Practically none. In the course of my service in Technical Assistance, the field missions were very few. Mostly we sent missions out to make an on-the-spot study and come back again. The Paris Office was one that we played a part in only because, when they decided to move from Rue de Lille to the Avenue d'Iena, we were involved in building the building in the Avenue d'Iena, or buying first of all a residence down the street and then building a building up the street. In the London Office we were not involved because this was more or less done by Johnny [John L.] Miller who, at that time, was a resident in Paris, but also was British and who knew how to go about getting into the proper streets in London. As far as the field missions are concerned, now we are involved in the sense that they're starting to build some Bank accommodations and there is an architect on the staff of Admin. Services, who we hired before I left, who serves as the person who works with the region which is setting up the mission. The ADM architect who goes out to look for the space, and to advise on the type of building to be constructed, the design, etcetera. How many of these we will build and maintain and own, I don't know. Some countries are very willing to have us do it and others are reluctant to have the Bank own any of their property. It's an open question.

MUIR: That draws to a conclusion a very productive interview. On behalf of the Bank's Oral History Program, thank you very much, Mr. Twining, for your time.

TWINING: Thank you, John. You're welcome.