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Transcript of interview with

HECTOR PRUD'HOMME

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By: John Muir

THE WORLD BANK/IFC ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Memorialist: Hector Prud'homme

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Interviewer: John Muir

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Also Present: James E. Twining, Jr.

MUIR: Today is May 2, 1985. My name is John Muir of the Oral History Program and I have with me at the headquarters of the World Bank Mr. Hector Prud'homme. Mr. Prud'homme joined the Bank in May 1951 as a loan officer in the European Division of the Loan Department. In February 1952, he was a member of the World Bank team that attempted to mediate the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute. Later in 1952, he transferred to the Department of Operations Asia and the Middle East, becoming its Chief Operations Officer in 1954. Mr. Prud'homme took leave of the Bank in October 1955 to become chief of the Technical Bureau of the Iran Plan Organization. He rejoined the Bank in August 1958 as the Assistant Director of the South Asia and Middle East Department. Mr. Prud'homme completed his Bank career in October 1959.

Welcome, Mr. Prud'homme. Would you like to reflect on your experiences as the Chief of the Technical Bureau of the Iran Planning Organization?

PRUD'HOMME: As an introduction, I would like to talk about the Bank's attempt to directly intervene in the Abadan Oil Dispute--the nationalization of the oil revenues in Iran. As you no doubt know, various attempts were made to get an agreement between the British and the Iranians for the re-opening of Abadan. They had closed it down completely; it was the largest refinery in the world.

[PRUD'HOMME]

I think this must have been largely Bob [Robert L.] Garner's brainchild. Iran was a member of the Bank, the British were members of the Bank, why don't we just offer to sort of mediate and see if we can bring the two parties together. So Gene [Eugene R.] Black and Bob Garner and whoever else was concerned thought this was a good idea to develop a little bit. And so, we invited various people to advise us as to how to deal with this. There was a time pressure for some reason or other. A quick decision had to be made and just like that I think Bob Garner pulled out of the hat, "Well, why don't we say that we'll get Abadan running again, but we've got to be free to hire technicians from any part of the world that we think are competent to do that. We'll get Abadan going again and we will keep the profits and we will hold them in escrow. They will grow at the rate of \$20 million a year, if not a month. Everybody's tongue will be hanging out, so then we'll say that the agreement is that the Bank will distribute this growing body of capital upon an agreement having been reached between the Iranians and the British. That will be bound to make the thing happen." It didn't.

So then Dr. Mossadegh came over here. And as foreigners so often do, he immediately went out to Bethesda to have a physical check-up. Bob Garner went out to see him. Mossadegh did not speak English much--he spoke French. And, of course, Persian. Bob Garner threw out that suggestion, "How would you like the Bank to intervene and this is the way we will work?"

"Wonderful!" said Mossadegh or words to that effect or giving the impression that he felt that way about it. I mention that because he turned right around, darn it, when he got to Iran. It is interesting that immediately it was decided with Mossadegh that we would send a little mission out to Iran. Everybody assumed that Abadan, no doubt, had been completely cannibalized; all that copper tubing and everything else and all the supplies, hardware and food, and so on would have disappeared. We

[PRUD'HOMME]

wanted to send someone out to have a look at the whole set-up and see if it is possible to put it back in operation.

So, Bob Garner goes to--and here I shouldn't be quoted because I may be wrong--but it was something like Socony and one other oil company and said to them, "We are going to send somebody out to Iran to have a look at Abadan. We don't know anything about the oil business; we don't pretend to. Will you please give us somebody who is the right person to come with us, and we'll have a look and make a report when we come back."

The oil companies said, "You, go mind your own goddamn business. Who the hell do you think you are f--king around here in the oil affair." And of course, they had the control of the oil by the throat and they weren't giving away anything.

So, then there was Cap [Torkild] Rieber. Cap Rieber was 70 or 72 years old at the time, but he was young in spirit. He was an old pirate. He was a pioneer. He had started out as cabin boy on a Norwegian sailing vessel of some kind; and then, after a tremendous amount of interesting vicissitudes, he ended up as Chairman of the Board of the Texas Company. And he was accused of being pro-German because he had lent Goering an automobile when Goering visited New York. So he told them where to head in and retired.

Bob Garner went to Cap Rieber. And Cap said, "Sounds like alot of fun; sure I'll go." So the mission was set up.

The mission consisted of me, as the head of the mission, and Cap Rieber; this old, most successful competent man to whom I looked up, and he looked properly down at me. He called me "boy" all the way--the head of the mission. "Boy"--he'd pull out a roll of \$50 bills--"we may want to

[PRUD'HOMME]

come back here sometime," so he'd pull out a \$50 bill and give it to the waiter or somebody or other like that. He fixed it so I could never go back! I never had the roll of \$50 bills.

Anyway, out we went. Abadan, he said, was in better shape than when the company had been there. Nothing had been touched except to keep it clean and tidy. And there was a hall that seemed like a hundred yards long--but maybe it was only a hundred feet long--full of jars of marmalade, preserves, biscuits and all kinds of delicious things to eat which the British had for themselves, and nobody had touched any of it. So we made that report.

When we went over, Cap and I had a letter signed by Garner addressed to Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh about this little mission and what we hoped from it, what we had understood from our meetings in Washington with Mossadegh himself. I tried to avoid including the British, the American and other embassies. This was to be a Bank-Iran discussion. But I showed the letter to Loy Henderson, our [U.S.] ambassador, a very competent and helpful person.

In the letter he came to that little line, or two, which said that if the Bank took over the rehabilitation of Abadan, we would have to be free to hire anybody that we needed, of any nationality. Henderson looked at this and he said, "You might as well go home. Mossadegh is immediately going to read that to mean British technicians and there's not going to be one British technician allowed back. I had some authority without authority, so to speak, so I decided to alter the wording of a bit of the letter. I took it out and worded it in such a way that although it left a way for us to interpret it the way we wanted, it didn't sound quite so blatant. But the problem was how to alter the writing on a sheet of paper already written on. So Henderson gave me a sheet of paper, the watermark of which showed "U.S.", and I took out that sentence.

[PRUD'HOMME]

Then down we went to see Dr. [Hossein] Pirnia, the Minister of Agriculture, who was a gentle, nice kind of a person. And I said, "Mr. Pirnia, I have here a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Garner. Would you please see to it that it reaches the Prime Minister? I'd like you to open it and read so that you understand and we'll explain anything in it that you are not clear on."

He said, "I can't open this letter. It has been sealed and it's addressed to the Prime Minister."

I said, "Yes but please go ahead."

"No, absolutely not." He took the letter, and off we went.

Well, it was exactly as Henderson had figured it. The next thing we knew, all the foreign newspaper reporters had been kicked out except one--a Briton. He called up. He said, "Mr. Prud'homme, I hear you're leaving Iran."

I said, "Now wait a minute. We only just got here."

"Well didn't you hear the Prime Minister say over the radio that this mission from the World Bank had come here to impose the British back again into the oil business, and there was no point in your staying here?"

I then said, "No, I haven't heard anything about this."

We were waiting in the hotel, when the telephone rang. Pirnia was on the telephone. He said, "Mr. Prud'homme, what is your decision about whether you're staying or going?"

I said, "I'm sorry, Dr. Pirnia, but we haven't heard anything to change our visit as we've set it up."

[PRUD'HOMME]

"Thank you very much," said Pirnia and he hung up. Then, about 20 minutes later, the telephone rings. Mr. Pirnia again. "Did you say, Mr. Prud'homme, what you thought you wanted to do about this?"

I said, "Dr. Pirnia, it's up to you. We're not going to do anything until you tell us what you want to do."

We then had a request to go down and see the Prime Minister, which we did, with jeeps in the front and jeep in the back and rifles and machine guns to give it sort of status. Mossadegh conducted his business from his home--a three-story rather simple house. We went in. Standing beside Mossadegh was Pirnia, and not only Pirnia was there, but Hassibi. Hassibi was a character who was, we were informed, the oil expert of Iran. The oil expert would take the Koran, he'd drop it on the table, and at that page it would tell him what to do about the oil business today...this kind of thing. Now how are you going to help those people to run an oil refinery?

He had a terrible experience which was that he was walking down in the Parliament Square of Tehran and two or three boys were there playing with a knife and one of them took the knife and threw it and it stuck in the doorway, just missing his head by about a quarter of an inch. Then the kids ran away. Within the next two or three days, his little boy fell back in a small fountain which they had in their garden. There was a metal spout sticking up for the water to spray out, and the child hit it and it killed the child.

These two things were all part of the same thing: the knife, the boys, his child, the whole oil business and everything else. This made him difficult to deal with. If anybody accused me of bringing any kind of quality to the negotiations of the World Bank, it's accepting this instead of trying to change it.

[PRUD'HOMME]

Anyway, so then I was with Mossadegh. We were talking, and he was sitting at his desk, which he always was. And roaring with laughter he said to me, "You're nothing but a British phonograph." On the strength of that Cap Rieber and I went down to Abadan. But nothing came of that, and finally it was resolved by another approach by a group of people, including some of the oil people.

One other little bit about the Bank. When it appeared for one moment that something could come out, Bob Garner came back to Iran. I was still in Iran. And a big meeting was being conducted in Mossadegh's three-level house and the meeting was in three levels--one was the Parliamentary group, one was one other group and one was Mossadegh's administrative group and his colleagues and so on and members of the Parliament. The meeting started at something like three o'clock and was supposed to end within an hour or two with some kind of an agreement. At eight o'clock in the evening we were supposed to fly out that night but we didn't. Bob Garner he couldn't take it. He was way over there in a corner. In these meetings, as you know, the chairs are all around the wall and there was jabber jabber, jabber, hour after hour after hour, and messages passing between one floor and the other floor. In the middle of all this a voice comes out of that corner, Garner's corner, singing, "Home, home on the range. Where the deer and the antelope play." And this is Garner--he couldn't take it any more. This is the Bank--the Bank in full operation. I don't know what effect it had but as this was supposed to be the highest possible governmental level meeting that you could imagine, it probably was a very good thing.

Perhaps the Bank ought to do more of this; sing that song or any song more often in your negotiations, rather than having lawyer who knows how this thing should be done and an accountant who knows how that account should be set up--none of which matters anything at all, really, in the long run. In the long run the question is whether the guy liked your song, "Home on the Range."

[PRUD'HOMME]

We were housed in the Officers' Club in Tehran, with a bayoneted guard down here and another one over there. We were up in the middle somewhere. The most beautiful rugs you ever saw covered an acre of ground. We had big bowls of caviar for breakfast every morning. The first morning or two that was good, but the fish eggs pall after a bit. Pirnia was visiting our apartment, and Cap Rieber was sitting there with his head back on a big sofa chair with his eyes shut. Pirnia was telling us about the poor Iranian people and the way they were suffering, how they needed all the help and one such thing and another.

He related how he and a friend of his were riding horseback through a little village and the horse defecated. The villagers all rushed out and worked and got a few grains of undigested wheat from the horse droppings.

At this point, Cap Rieber came to life. He couldn't take it. He came to life and says, "Pirnia, I want to tell you something. The trouble with you Iranians is you don't know how to do a damn thing. Now you bring a few Texans over here we would make a real country out of this." Such diplomacy! Pirnia, being a nice person and not knowing what to do about this just had to take it whether he liked it or not. Anyway, I guess that's enough about the Mossadegh operation.

The next part of my story is about the Technical Bureau. The leading figure in this part of the story is Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, an extraordinary man of extraordinary vitality and comprehension. He was Iranian ambassador to the United Nations at one time; something in Washington at one time; and he was a banker for a time. He was a driving, able person. The Shah put him in charge of the Seven Year Plan. Many of these countries, of course, now have five or seven year plans. This was a seven year plan. And at that time, the oil revenues were running at about \$200 million a year. And Ebtehaj was fighting with the Shah all the time.

[PRUD'HOMME]

Now Ebtehaj and the Shah met every week. The Shah was absolutely committed and devoted to the development of his country, and he was trying to make his people learn faster than they knew how. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Shah, no matter that he went a little bit off the rail later in life. Ebtehaj came along, and the Shah gives him the Seven Year Plan Organization to run. Therefore, gives him the money with which to carry out his plans. Other Iranians are just trying to suck some of that money out, and Ebtehaj just shoved them out of his office. The office of the Seven Year Plan Organization was in a long corridor with a man at each door, of course bringing in tea every 20 minutes. And every now and then, hurtling out of that door would come a member of the Iranian Parliament who had been in there to say that his nephew's grandson would very much appreciate it if Mr. Ebtehaj would somehow or other give him a job. And Ebtehaj would throw him out.

Anyhow, Ebtehaj came to Washington. Mr. Black highly respected Ebtehaj, from what little he knew of him at the time. Ebtehaj asked Mr. Black for practically the whole engineering staff of the World Bank. He said that he was going to make a rule that was going to be shocking to the Iranians. It was going to be that no project would be approved and carried out in Iran with this money that hadn't been vetted by a highly competent engineer of one type or another. He wanted an engineer who would deal with railroads, one who would deal with manufacturing and one who would deal with agriculture, and so on. He needed about a half-dozen such people and he asked if the Bank would provide them. Gene Black said no, that we were busy enough using our own people here on all our own projects without going off and taking Ebtehaj's project. But we would help him find and hire good people if he wanted, and he did want this help. And so that responsibility was given to me.

The first thing I tried to do was to get somebody who would be the head of a little technical group made up of different engineers. And having had

[PRUD'HOMME]

that experience with Mossadegh, I knew perfectly well that if we had two British or two French or two American engineers on this Technical Bureau, that if we gave an order let's say for railroad wagons to a French company, why it would be suspected that these two French engineers and the French company had been in collusion. So I suggested, and it was thought a good idea, that these engineers should be international. And so I had no two engineers from the same country.

No engineer, or no anybody, in his right mind would take a job in Iran in the expectation that he would ever be paid, because he might never be paid. He might be paid 15 years later, but not right then. It was all mixed with who is using the money and how they are billing.... One thing or another. So we said that the Planning Organization will give the Bank some such sum as \$175,000 for a year and we will make the contracts with these engineers who are however working for the Plan Organization under a contract to be paid by the World Bank. An then we knew if something went wrong and the Plan Organization had to fold up we, the Bank, would be left with half a dozen engineers, but that didn't bother the Bank very much. Any one of them could have gotten himself a good job; some of them would be wanted by the Bank itself. So that's what we did.

The first thing I did was to go out searching for a head of this Technical Bureau. I had almost nailed down an ideal chap who was Minister of Public Works out in a Canadian province. Canadians, of course, are perfect for these sensitive operations because they are assumed not to have ulterior political motives. However, at the last moment he decided he didn't want to do it. He had been offered an even bigger job out in the western part of Canada.

I don't know whether it was boastful of me, but in any case I suggested myself to establish the Technical Bureau. I had to find the people first.

[PRUD'HOMME]

I must have spent three months I traveling to England, France, Holland, Belgium and Italy. And everywhere I went I plucked an engineer. Then we put this thing together and went out there and we did, I think, a bang-up job. We were the great authorities, and everybody knew they had to go through this Technical Bureau. Ebtehaj had to say that project was all right or not, and we would make recommendations to him.

So that was the Tehcnial Bureau. Overseeing all the projects which everybody was pushing, approving some and suggesting changes in others. I think, probably all to the good. I was then on leave of absence from the Bank in order to take this job in Iran.

The Bank asks itself whether my having been with the Bank carried any weight. And the answer is yes. The ghost or the spirit of the Bank was always behind my shoulder. People are very respectful of an institution from which they hope to get money sooner or later, and so I think the Bank played an important role. Such a job would be difficult without it. Of course Ebtehaj personally counted enormously because he was committed to work with the Bank and do what the Bank required. The Frenchman with us had been acting Minister of Public Works in Morocco, a man of great reputation. The Englishman was dealing with manufacturing. The American was dealing partly with agriculture. That's the way it worked. When a project came thorough it was handed to us. Ebtehaj was able to say, "Nothing goes through until my Technial Bureau has had a look at it." And people then shut up because they knew the Technical Bureau was a rather powerful group. And a lot of it was, I think, or a perceptible amount had to do with the fact that I represented the spirit of the Bank, even though I was not working for the Bank at that moment.

TWINING: You left obviously before many, or certainly before, all of these projects were completed. Certainly, they were long-term projects.

PRUD'HOMME: Almost no projects were ever completed.

TWINING: Do have any recollection of, or knowledge of, how successful they were after all this effort of putting them together and vetting them?

PRUD'HOMME: I would say that for the most part the Technical Bureau had been an influence in moving a project away from this direction where the bossman and his nephew and great grandson were all dabbling in this thing, moved it out of there and then technically helped out. But it was very slow. I think it's safe to say that a project carried out and completed is a rare pearl. Almost nothing gets completed. A lot of people think they can handle projects.

The Russians had financed a grain silo somewhere near Shiraz, where there wasn't any grain. They were proud of it and they made a special appointment with me to go and see it. So we drove out and I saw it. And it was a very fine, big silo but it had never had one ounce of grain in it. But that didn't make any difference. "Here we have this wonderful silo," they would say. "Don't you think that's very fine?" Yes, I thought it was very fine. But it didn't work. You have to have somebody who manages the distribution of the grain and all the rest of it.

You asked whether the Iranians might be suffering under Khomeini. Well a primitive society doesn't suffer a hell of a lot other than from nature--droughts and floods. For insistance, if you are one of the tribesmen down in the southwest you have your camels, your sheep, your goats, your horses, your tents and your wives. You just go up the mountains in the summertime and you live up there. Then you come down in the wintertime and then you live down there. But you don't have the problem of faulty transportation or no electricity or no hot water.

[PRUD'HOMME]

I'm overstating the simplicity of the Iranian society but it's not terribly overstated and it's very, very suspicious. And the farther you go into the countryside, the more suspicious they are of government. But I can imagine this probably is not unusual the world over.

TWINING: So the failure of some of these projects ever to be completed or completed successfully probably has limited impact on the government or on the society in Iran.

PRUD'HOMME: It had as much impact as you can have. That's the thing you have to accept--to accept a very slow, halting progress, dropping back and then moving ahead a little bit.

TWINING: So, it's an educational process.

PRUD'HOMME: There were rows between all kinds of people. As I said, the Shah was devoted to the program of development. For instance, in Kurdistan, in the south, after that big dam had begun to be built on the Karaj or Karoun River, the Governor of Kurdistan was beginning to make monkey business of some kind. Ebtehaj went to the Shah. I used to go with him. Ebtehaj said, "Your Majesty, the Governor of Kurdistan has got the dam project stuck."

"Governor who did you say?"

"Governor so and so."

"I'll take care of it."

And the next week when we went there, he had taken care of it. He had called up the Governor and said, in effect, "You get on the ball here or

[PRUD'HOMME]

else." This is the way the Shah worked. And of course, if he carried this kind of, almost arrogance, too far, he'd make a million enemies--and he had a million enemies. That was one of his problems.

Take, for instance, roads. We made a mistake. There was an English company who should have built the road. But we took them on only as consultants and not as the builders, because the Iranians felt they knew how to build the road. So the English came as consultants. And they had a little bit of a special status. They were not part of my staff and I think they never got paid, or at most if they did it wasn't very much. But anyhow there was a big demonstration of how this Iranian firm who knew all about roads was working on the road from Tehran to the Kafghan. And they and the British did have some fascinating equipment, including some which packed the earth, some which I had never seen before.

Anyway a train-load of people went out, including Bank people. And the brakes on the last car the brakes had not been released, so this train went dragging itself across the countryside with smoke coming out of the rear wheels. Everybody admired the work. It was to be a brand new asphalted road. But within a year the edges of that road began to crumble. The Iranians felt that this proved that they were cheated. The idea that it could be difficult to do something, and that it might not always succeed, was not in their conception.

If you go out to the villages, which we did, the villagers would say that they had to have water and roads and electricity. We would discuss all this sitting down, sitting on cushions or on a rug on the floor with very handsome-looking older men with big beards. These would be the councilmen and representatives of the village. "Just a moment, please," we would say. "It isn't possible to do all these three things at one time. If you were to do one of these, which one would you do first?"

[PRUD'HOMME]

"Water, roads, electricity," they'd reply. They never would come off it, so you had to make a decision. And you made a decision, and if it didn't work out 150 percent, why then you were a fool and had been cheating. It was complicated.

There was one little village where we visited the bath house. The bath house was a big dome without windows, but in the very top of it there was an empty gallon jar sticking up there that let a little light coming through. Otherwise, the inside black and greasy. The fire to heat the water was made on the outside of this dome and the water would go inside. So then I started cooking up something which I never did anything further with but which would have been fun. That was to do things a little bit against the government. Because the minute you said, "I think we can get the government to help you put up a new bath house. You'll need cement and you'll need stone." The minute you mentioned the government, never mind forget it, they didn't want anything to do with anything that had to do with the government. But, if you said "I'm a friend of Mr. Ebtehaj--you've probably heard of Mr. Ebtehaj--and if you people will keep quiet we can probably get a little cement, and some stone and bricks and stuff around here and nobody would know," they would think it was a wonderful idea, that it would work. I was only sorry that I wasn't in Iran long enough to develop this kind of thing somewhat more.

MUIR: May I ask you how Bank management at Headquarters evaluated the success of the Technical Bureau?

PRUD'HOMME: The closer your question leads to the concern of the senior Bank management, the more supportive was the Bank. Down the line it seemed a bit difficult for Bank staff to grasp that the Iranian Technical Bureau operation did not fit their ideas of more formal Bank operations.

[PRUD'HOMME]

It sounds as though I was trying to avoid a direct answer but my answer has to be fuzzy. Management thought we would be able somewhat to shift the direction and the rate at which things were expected to happen. And we represented a principle of--it sounds high falooting--but a principle of honesty. All these things are almost an atmosphere rather than something you can really evaluate. You might evaluate the roads, cotton mills--yes cotton mills, maybe without any cotton at that particular spot--a fertilizer plant--again I think in Shiraz where there was no use for a fertilizer plant, but that was one that got away from the Technical Bureau. Finally, I think it was a Belgian outfit that built the plant. Finally the Shah had given in and told the group that they could have this plant to build. And there was nothing we could do about it at that point.

However the Bank would evaluate the work of the Technical Bureau, I would evaluate it as as being as much as you can accomplish against that criterion, and that's a very difficult one. It's mostly an atmosphere, which I would call part of the education that Samuel Johnson was talking about; that over a generation or two or three of this kind of slowly directing them, maybe they would probably get to the point where they could accomplish their own projects. And, mind you, a good number of Iranians were very successful. It's like the wealthy Indians, the Tatas and company. There were a few Iranians like that who were doing things in a big way, doing them for themselves.

MUIR: Did you get much guidance from Bank headquarters, or were you really on your own there?

PRUD'HOMME: None. We were on our own in the Technical Bureau, reporting to Ebtehaj. In the Mossadegh negotiation, it had been entirely as directed by the Bank, responding to the economic and political conditions.

[PRUD'HOMME]

The young men, sometimes with families, who were posted in the Belgian Congo, they're like the young Dutchmen out in the Netherlands East Indies: highly trained, properly screened and so on, and doing a terrific job. I had a little of that same feeling about the ones that I met in the Belgian Congo. These were devoted young men--relatively young--who are interested in that country getting on and in their area doing well and all the rest. Then you pull them all out. Then what happens? What happens is Khomeini and company.

So, I think that's about all that you would want to hear about the Technical Bureau, unless I am reminded of some more specific factory projects.

One case was a cannery down on the Persian Gulf. It canned what I think looked rather like sardines but they also canned bigger pieces of bigger fish. And we drove in there. We had a cavalcade of three cars including Ebtehaj's. They had been expecting us, so there was red, white and blue bunting on the entrance gate of the administration building, and green and red lights turning on and off, and a luncheon. But, first we had to visit the factory part. So we went through wonderful shiny nickel steel machinery that boiled the catch and that put the stuff in the cans. Then we all went to lunch, and this little plant was humming away canning fish.

Gerard, my Frenchman, and I went for a little stroll after lunch, and the hum of the factory went down and down and finally there was no hum. So, he said "Let's go over and see." So over we went to see. Well they had a great big refrigerator with huge doors and all this equipment. In this refrigerator was one small tuna and nothing else. And there were no more fish to can. They had spent the previous two or three weeks trying to get the fishermen to bring fish, but there apparently weren't very many fish. So we asked them what they were going to do with this tuna. "Well,

[PRUD'HOMME]

Mr. Ebtehaj may be here for supper. We will keep this tuna for his supper." Then there wouldn't be any more fish. And this is an expensive, well-built cannery. Gain or loss? Loss, I would suppose. Somebody must have learned something from it, but it wouldn't stick very long.

I don't know. There's no substitute for that time factor of slowly developing one generation after another. Maybe in the next generation, the eighteen-year old son of the well-to-do Persian family will be willing to go and in his summer vacation work with his hands somewhere--maybe. Then if he does it, perhaps his son after him, and so gradually the thing grows. The Bank is playing an important role. While at the same time, I dare say, if I have tried to evaluate what the Bank has accomplished and what the Bank projects have accomplished in terms in the relation to what we thought they should accomplish, I'd probably find also that there was a gap there. Either you go in and you do it for them, which is a mistake, or you let them do it.

MUIR: I think it's been a very interesting contribution to our program. I would like to thank you, Mr. Prud'homme, for taking the time to visit us.